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Abstract  
This study explored the socio-political capacity and agency of the professional Black 
middle class (BMC). It examined how Black professionals construct their professional 
and socio-political identities and the relationships therein. 
It finds that for the Black middle class race is a stronger identity marker than class, 
which affects its support and attitudes towards the African National Congress. Race, 
residence, intra-racial inequality function as the factors through which the BMC 
rejects a middle class identity. At the same time, education, income and affordability 
form the variables of middle class location for many of the BMC members. The 
rejection of a middle class identity enables it to maintain class unity with the poor and 
working class. In this way, the study found that these were the major markers of 
identity for the middle class.  
This study also found that while the apartheid-times BMC support for the liberation 
movement and the ANC was never unanimous or unambiguous, in the post-1994 era 
the ANC has consolidated BMC support. However, 20 years into democracy, this 
support is beginning to fragment. The primary reasons are the politicisation of state 
resources and workplaces, and widespread unfettered corruption. Second, the study 
finds that the need to consolidate middle class position, Black tax and debt sustains 
the BMC’s support for the ANC. The BMC support for the ANC is instrumental and 
sustained by its precarious class position of asset deficit, Black tax and debt. More 
crucially the perpetuation of racial economic exclusion or the floating colour bar, 
particularly within the corporate sector reinforces its support for the ANC – as it seeks 
this government party to improve the socio-economic conditions in the country. This 
suggests the socio-political character of the upper and middle class is maturing, much 
more complicated and consolidating democracy in particular ways to the South 
African political economy. It follows the Rueschmereyian analysis of political 
character of the BMC.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
Introduction 
There is no evidence that in recent years such a sizeable Black middle 
class is emerging and neither is there reason to believe that it will emerge 
in the future. … Even though the Black middle class is growing quite 
rapidly it does so from a very small base and in the context of a large 
number of Black unemployed. This in itself would be sufficient to suggest 
that if the Black middle class continues to grow at the same rate it is 
unlikely to become a numerous or very influential group in South African 
society (Meth, 1983:173). 
1.1 Introduction & contextual background 
The post-liberation Black middle class (BMC) has significantly expanded 
alongside millions of the working class, the poor and unemployed. Despite its 
numeric insignificance, the social, economic and political role of the Black middle 
class, its “wealth, patterns of consumption, style of life, and moderating or 
revolutionary tendencies,” has long held the interest of the academic community 
(Kuper, 1965: ix). But, throughout South Africa’s modern history, various scholars 
have questioned the quality of this interest (Kuper, 1965; Nzimande, 1986; Southall, 
2014). Kuper, for instance, lamented the exoticising interest imposed on this class, 
arguing that it often lacked analytical depth, a charge that was endorsed by Southall 
almost fifty years later. Kuper protested against the proclivity of academics for 
exoticising the Black middle class of the time; “as if the emergence of the strata 
differentiated from a general mass of impoverished and poorly educated African 
workers were a sport of evolution” ibid. In the 1980s Nzimande observed “very little 
work has been done to understand the social and political significance of the Black 
middle class.” Together these criticisms suggest a lack of maturation of the South 
African social science treatment of the subject. 
Southall (2014) observes that journalists and advertisers in South Africa have 
paid greater attention to the Black middle class than academics. So that to date, the 
predominant perspective pertains to the strata’s buying or consumption power 
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(Southall, 2014). The prevalence of this understanding is evident in the media images 
that are captured and reflected back to society as a whole: the big house, the 
expensive cars, the designer clothes; shoes and cellphones. Importantly, images 
reflect excessive indulgences of expensive alcohol and dining. These are the Black 
diamonds (UCT, 2012) who are “young and driving a BMW” (Carrol, 2004 cited in 
Mabandla, 2012:1). Acclaimed African authors have even dedicated characters to 
them: ‘Lankunle’ in Wole Sonyika’s The Lion and the Jewel and Black Diamonds by 
Zakes Mda.  
This study aims to take an in-depth look at the class, professional and political 
attitudes of Black managers, higher professionals and entrepreneurs. It is guided, 
firstly by the hope of improving our understanding; secondly and more importantly, 
hopes to escape the recent tendency to pathologise the new Black middle class. The 
rest of this chapter discusses the political and economic discourses surrounding the 
Black middle class and closes by outlining the thesis structure.  
1.2 Definitional approaches 
While the use of racial categories in South Africa has contentious history, for the 
purposes of this study, I use the term ‘Black’ to refer only to those that were 
categorized as African or Black-African under apartheid law, therefore excluding 
population groups currently referred to as Coloured, Indian and Chinese. Given that I 
am also referring to a population that encompasses many nationalities, I capitalize the 
‘b’ in Black. Pre-liberation studies of class typically refer to the Black middle class as 
either the ‘African bourgeoisie;’ ‘African elite’ or ‘African middle class.’ These terms 
also refer to the same population group as explained. In order to maintain connections 
with this literature, I use ‘Black’ and ‘African’ interchangeably or simultaneously. 
The middle class herein are entrepreneurs, managers and professionals. The ‘old 
BMC’ refers the BMC created during apartheid and ‘new BMC’ to post-liberation 
created. Furthermore, the terms post-apartheid and post-liberation indicate the period 
after 1994. 
I recognise that sociological research on professions defines professionalization 
as the process that occupations undergo to achieve the status of a profession (Evetts, 
2014:34). However, I use the term to describe the increase in the number of Black 
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people becoming educated, obtaining qualifications and credentials and entering into 
recognised professions.  
1.3 BMC formation: the ANC, EE & BEE discourse 
Scholars’ explanations of class formation in the post-liberation era rest heavily 
upon what Lebelo (1990) once called “legislative enactments and administrative fiat” 
that have either acted to inhibit, assist or revitalize the emergence, growth and 
development of the new BMC. The enactment of the Black Economic Empowerment 
Acts (BEE, 2003; BBBEE, 2007) and the Employment Equity Act (EE, 1998) by the 
African National Congress’s (ANC) government is pervasively held as responsible for 
the formation of the new BMC. This has been argued by authors such as: Mattes, 
2014; Modisha, 2006; Rivero, du Toit & Kotze 2003; Southall, 2004; Schlemmer, 
2005; Seekings, 2010; Visagie, 2011; Alexander, Ceruti, Motseke, Phadi & Wale, 
2013 and UCT, 2014. Historically, racialised colonial and apartheid state laws stunted 
the development of a numerically significant Black middle class, but facilitated that of 
a white middle class (Lebelo, 1990; Southall, 2014). Notably, white middle class 
formation was - first for English speaking whites, and later for Afrikaners - facilitated 
through the expansion of middle class occupations within the apartheid state 
bureaucracy (Bonnin & Ruggunan, 2013:1). This has been reversed as today 40% of 
skilled Africans work in government compared to just 14% of whites (UCT, 2012).  
This mode of BMC expansion has engendered the pervasive argument that the 
ANC’s redistributive policies have directly, if not singularly, created the new BMC. 
The rhetoric goes:  
 because “… the ANC sees itself as the vehicle of transformation of the 
political economy towards a goal of equity and growth… (Southall, 
2005:72) …  
 and that “in less than ten years, for example, a Black elite has emerged 
in South Africa, staffing the top levels of the civil service and taking 
seats in corporate boardrooms… (Winant & Seidman, 2001:217) …  
 due to “aggressive new affirmative action policies” (Pottinger, 
2008:105) … 
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 and a “project of Black economic empowerment which has seen it 
[ANC] attempt to promote Black-owned corporations [and] a Black 
capitalist class,” (Southall). 
The ANC too lays claim to the BMC’s expansion, ascribing it to the influence and 
success of its redress and transformation policies. Notably, the ANC’s spokesperson 
Jackson Mthembu proclaimed “the African National Congress celebrates the 
successes of our deliberate and decisive socio-economic transformation policies 
which are yielding results.” Similarly, Jacob Zuma President of the party and 
Republic of South Africa declared “as a result of these [B-BBEE] and other 
developments resulting from progressive government policies, there has been an 
impressive growth of the Black middle class.” 
However, alongside many analysts, the ANC has recognized the corruption 
challenges faced by the party and the government it leads that have resulted from 
class aspiration. This is illustrated by Southall’s (2005) criticism that the increase of 
the BMC has been cronyistic and aimed at driving what he calls domestic patriotic 
investment. In tandem with such criticisms, Ndletyana, Makhalemele & Mathekga 
(2013) studied the effect of ANC patronage politics on local government 
performance. They found that councillors used their political capital to override 
decisions of municipal officials by ordering specific job and tender allocations. 
Consequentially, qualified audits have been a perennial problem for the ANC 
government, where 56,1% of audited municipalities received qualified audits for 
2011/2012 (SAIRR, 2013:875).  
The ANC now suffers from the enduring fear that individuals from the new Black 
middle class, having benefitted from state opportunities for advancement, may be 
tempted to follow personal advancement or upward social mobility aspirations and 
thus mutate into “a parasitic bureaucratic bourgeoisie” (ANC 2007: para. 105). The 
party aims to take “urgent action” against its parasitic bureaucratic bourgeoisie and 
has resolved that “measures should be put in place to prevent abuse of power or office for 
private gain or factional interests” (ANC’s 53rd National Conference Resolutions, 
2013:4). Labour unions have also been victim to the ‘corrupting’ tendency of upward 
mobility as illustrated by Beresford’s (2012) research at the National Union of 
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Mineworkers (NUM). Beresford found that upward mobility resulting from the 
promotion of shop stewards to management positions was eroding NUM’s unifying 
class identity. 
Flowing from the above described discourse is the argument that “race-based 
policies of the ANC have created an exceptionally strong bond between it and the 
African core middle class” and the retention of a “powerful sense of solidarity with 
the ANC and the former liberation movement” (Schlemmer, 2005:10). Schlemmer’s 
study reflected the dominance of BMC-ANC support, wherein 64% and 68% of his 
study’s interviewees and survey respondents said they would vote for the ANC in the 
next elections. Notably, his results show a significant fracturing of BMC-ANC 
support as 23% were seeking out another party. Schultz-Herzenberg’s (2009b) 
doctoral study of voter attitudes between 1994 and 2009 supports this argument where 
the Black owner/employer and professional/supervisory occupations supported the 
ANC. 
Schlemmer explained that the BMC-ANC bond did not indicate singular 
captivation and acquiescence to the ANC. Instead it reflected a pragmatic preference 
for the ANC, one that is consistent, solid and durable. Thus BMC support takes place 
alongside the questioning and critiquing the party’s governmental performance and 
policies; particularly from the tertiary educated, bureaucrats, independent 
professionals and community leaders. Schlemmer (2005:11) concluded that the 
increasing dissention of BMC members within the ANC would begin to assist the 
process of democratic pluralism and consolidation. 
A much debated issue has also been the political alignment of the old BMC. 
Theorists debated how the racially motivated creation of the BMC would impact on 
its political alignment. This issue rose to prominence with the apartheid state’s 
extension of multiple, but carefully limited economic reforms aimed at moderately 
increasing the numbers of the old BMC. The apartheid state sought to utilise this class 
as a buffer between the white minority and rioting Black masses: workers; unions and 
political parties. Thus in promoting a Black middle class, the reforms included the 
additional extension of greater independence to Bantustans and urban-based 
community councils. The apartheid state also widened the provision of trading 
licenses, business finance. The relaxation of the colour bar was part of the reforms 
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and implemented through the Black Advancement (BA) programme which resulted in 
the placement of Africans in middle class occupations at the semi-skilled level. 
Notwithstanding the caveats and permutations in the arguments, the analysis 
thereof was polarized. On the one hand, some theorists advanced the argument that 
‘because of economic inclusion, the new Black middle class would align itself with 
the reforming apartheid capitalist state and white monopoly capital’ (Southall, 1980; 
Saul & Gelb 1981; Sarakinsky, 1986; Hudson & Sarakinsky, 1986; Jozana, 1989). 
Therefore, given the material inclusion and upward mobility, class rather than race 
would emerge as the dominant organizing principle for the Black middle class. The 
opposing argument was that ‘despite economic inclusion, the apartheid-made new 
Black middle class would align itself with national struggle for liberation’ 
(Nolutshungu, 1982; Bank, 1990; Nzimande, 1986; 1991). Joe Slovo, the preeminent 
theorist of the South African Communist Party (SACP) stressed racial solidarity over 
class alliance stating that given the racialisation of class, the Black middle class had 
no political alliance with its white counterparts: - 
The limitations imposed by the white state upon its development meant that 
the historically, the African petty bourgeoisie linked up with the African 
masses in a class alliance contained within the rubric of the African 
National Congress (Southall, 1980:39).  
Southall (1980) has also observed that the reforms, while having the veneer of 
deracialising the economy, were more about stripping Black political movements of 
leadership, given that some of this leadership came from the Black middle class. 
Nolutshungu (1982:91) in fact argued that the quantitative nature of material 
expansion to the Black bourgeoisie was not more important than the fact that the 
relations being forged with Black business were more about “containment rather than 
transformation, encadrement rather than embourgeoisement.”  
Though never unanimous and unambiguous (Southall, 2014:653) the old BMC 
aligned itself with the working class and the liberation struggle. At different points of 
South Africa’s history, segments of the BMC were either fully co-opted to support 
apartheid or others opposed apartheid and joined forces with the broader liberation 
movement, under the leadership of the ANC. For example, Some of the chiefs that 
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supported apartheid at the height of monopoly capitalism by maintaining the supply 
of cheap Black labour to ‘white’ South Africa and keeping the population politically 
in-check, became increasingly opposed to apartheid by the 1980s (Bank & Southall, 
1996).  
The political stance of urban and Bantustan based Black business segment was 
chameleon like and morphed from co-option to rejection. This segment, while 
opposed to racial discrimination bought into the economic reforms and moderate 
inclusion, received capital and infrastructural investments and loans from white 
business and the apartheid state. This caused Hudson & Sarakinsky (1986:182) to 
boldly declare: - 
Increasingly it appears that the apartheid state is capable of absorbing the 
demands of the urban African bourgeoisie, and that it is possible for this 
class to grow both in size and power within the parameters of apartheid. 
This means that it is chimerical to continue proposing, and hoping to see 
established, an alliance which has as its aim the overthrow of apartheid. 
Civil servants and employees: nurses, teachers, clerks etc., aligned with the 
broader liberation movement and active in the struggle against apartheid, even in 
instances where some were co-opted. Nzimande (1991) argued that corporate 
professionals as the most politically conservative group, reluctant to participate in the 
structures of the democratic movement in their communities. Instead this group’s 
participation was carefully constructed and its participation happened by default: 
because they were Black and lived in the townships, they could not entirely ignore the 
mass struggles. Most of thus group’s activities were church, welfare or developmental 
activities and sports and recreation. Overall, it would be interesting therefore, to see 
how the political attitudes have evolved.  
1.4 BMC capacity for democratic consolidation & pluralism 
Flowing from Lipset’s and Seong & Torres’s (1993) wealth-democracy thesis, 
in which economic development is positively correlated to democracy in Western 
societies, South African social scientists have sought to establish if the quantitative 
increase of the Black middle class could result in greater democratic multi-partyism 
by disrupting the ANC’s political hegemony. These scholars include: Torres, 2000; 
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Rivero et al., 2003; Southall, 2004, 2005 & 2014; Schlemmer, 2005; Schulz-
Herzenberg, 2009b and Mattes, 2003 & 2014. In totality therefore, these scholars 
have explored whether increasingly varied identities; increased education and income; 
and greater class autonomy could or have contributed towards democratic pluralism 
and thus democratic consolidation. 
For some scholars, the analysis has been two fold. First, it is argued that the 
BMC is too numerically insignificant to carry out this task, (Rivero et al., 2003 & 
Ndletyana, 2014). Similarly, Mattes (2014) concluded that the BMC is still a nascent 
factor in South African politics while Southall (2014) argued that the BMC cannot be 
taken as inherently progressive. Secondly, the dominant party thesis – foregrounded 
by Giliomee & Simkins (1999) – has been used to countervail the possibility of such 
action by the Black middle class: because the BMC’s racial and class interests are 
aligned to the ANC and, as the BMC is itself largely a product of the democratic 
regime - they remain loyal and are unwilling to challenge the ANC’s electoral 
hegemony (Giliomee & Simkins, 1999; Southall, 2004, 2005 & 2014). Therefore, the 
Black middle class becomes a politicized class whose political capacity is constructed 
as limited. 
In contrast to the above and notably Southall, Schulz-Herzenberg (2009b) 
argued that the South African social order is increasingly being characterized by 
varied social identities and value systems. For Schulz-Herzengerg (2009a, b) class 
and age identities had the potential to form new political cleavages that contest the 
racial cleavage that has thus far been the primary social and political identity. 
Consequential to the evolution of the BMC’s identity repertoires, even in the absence 
of internal coherence and identity cohesion within the BMC as earlier argued for by 
Schlemmer (2005), so do the chances of fracturing the dominant position of the ANC 
in the polity increase, particularly as the BMC becomes more varied in its political 
attitudes (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009b). This is supported by Mattes’ (2003) who found 
that class and occupation were emerging as strong identity markers within the BMC 
and that education and economic development were becoming important policy issues 
for this class. Later, Schlemmer supposed that as the BMC’s assessment of 
government policy and performance increased, particularly on education and the 
economy, it would begin to withdraw its ANC support.  
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Extending Schlemmer’s earlier supposition, Mattes found that the BMC was 
more likely to demand services of a higher order such as free speech, government 
accountability versus survival goods such as food, water or shelter. In contrast to 
Southall, Mattes (2014:666) argued that the BMC is less likely to identify with the 
governing ANC, and more likely to say they would vote for the Democratic Alliance 
(DA). But, in somewhat a contradictory stance, Mattes also recognised that the BMC 
was far more likely to define its interests based on the deep history of apartheid than 
their material status. Against Southall’s BMC-ANC dependency thesis, Mattes 
(2014:19) declares: - 
Thus, there is no need to fear that by helping to create a new Black 
middle class, the governing party has bought itself a new, growing 
constituency whose loyalty might sustain it if, or when, it begins to lose 
support amongst the homeless an unemployed.  
Similarly to Rivero et al. (2003), Mattes (2014) argued that the BMC is more 
likely to exit the democratic system than to voice its disgruntlement in any form 
of collective action. However, for Schulz-Herzeberg (2009b) South African 
voters are more likely to withdraw support for parties than vote for another 
party. Statistically, it is possible that the BMC as with other segments of the 
South African population is beginning to withdraw, rather than vote for an 
alternative its support for the ANC. This is potentially illustrated by the ANC’s 
declining share of electoral support. So, while the ANC still achieved 66%, 69% 
and 66% of the electoral support in 1999, 2004 and 2009 respectively, it 
suffered a decrease in turnout and a reduced share of the vote (Schulz-
Herzenberg’s, 2009a:4). The proportion of the voting age population (VAP) 
which voted for the ANC was 47% in 1999 and decreased to 39% in 2004 and 
2009. A similar trend was reported by the South African Institute for Race 
Relations (SAIRR, 2013) in which the ANC’s proportion of eligible voters 
decreased to 38,7% in 2009 from 53,9% in 1994.  
1.5 BMC: intersections of race & class  
Southall (2004) and Khunou & Krige (2013) see the middle class as important 
for social and political stability. Southall (2004:535) argued that state managers and 
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the civil petty bourgeoisie as beneficiaries of EE remained ideologically aligned and 
sympathetic to the poor but were more individualistic in their advancement and their 
failing to adequately support the poor. However, Schlemmer (2005) and Khunou & 
Krige (2013) criticised the low levels of the BMC’s participation in voluntary 
organisations. Schlemmer drew the same conclusion given for the ineffectiveness of 
the BMC in democratic pluralism: it is too new and too small. 
Earlier, Kuper (1965:23) stated that the BMC was becoming more like the 
white middle class, as the BMC increasingly had the same jobs and lifestyle habits of 
the white middle class, with political rights being the distinguishing factor. For many 
therefore, being Black and middle class meant living a “white life.” While this may be 
true, in the democratic period Statistics South Africa (2009) found that the BMC’s 
income expenditure lagged other racial groups. Only 14% of urban African 
households spent over R5, 000 per month, compared to 45% white, 27% Asian and 
23% coloured middle class households. Schlemmer’s (2005:11) argument was 
different. He found mutual isolation between the white and Black middle classes, with 
little informal and extra-occupational contact between them. Contrastingly, Khunou 
(2013:1) recognised that the Black middle class was “othered in interaction with 
whites and white spaces.”  
If we take managers as a proxy for professionals, then the tension between 
race and advancement into middle class occupations previously dominated by white 
people was illustrated in Nzimande’s (1991) doctoral study of African personnel 
managers who had benefitted from the BA programme and Modisha’s (2006) 
master’s study of Black managers as beneficiaries of EE. Both were conducted in the 
corporate sector.  
Nzimande and Modisha found that corporate spaces and notions of 
professionalism therein were racialized and underpinned by the ideology of white 
supremacy. Illustrating this, Nzimande argued that much of the liberal scholarship of 
the time used the so-called ‘backwardness’ and inadequate educational backgrounds 
of Africans to validate the slowness of African advancement in varied workspaces. He 
argued that the BA programme was used to control, amend and shape Black people’s 
way of being, through expectations of specific types of dress; acquaintances and ways 
of speaking. Of this he concluded that the success of African corporate professionals 
19 
 
depended on their acceptance of racism in the workplace. Modisha’s study illustrated 
the perpetuation of an invisible colour bar and the lack of substantive inclusion of 
Black managers in various corporate workspaces.  
Echoing Schlemmer, Khunou (2013) states that various segments of the 
affluent and educated Black middle class struggle to reconcile class and racial 
identity. BMC respondents in Schlemmer’s study (2005:7) said they were middle 
class, 31% said them were working class while 5% claimed to be poor. Schlemmer 
(2005:7) reasoned that while the BMC enjoyed high salaries they had not “acquired 
the material security of accumulated assets.” Alternatively Phadi & Ceruti, (2011:99) 
found that Black people in Soweto used ‘affordability,’ self-sufficiency, support, 
comparison, youth culture, and language to self-identify as middle class. 
Affordability, “the size of your pocket” and having a job were the key concepts that 
Sowetans used to classify and identify the middle class (Phadi & Ceruti, 2011:99-
100).  
The new BMC, especially the state-employed BMC, has been framed as a 
hyper-consuming class, which implicitly and explicitly is corrupt and non-productive. 
Words like tenderpreneurship, rent-seeking, corruption and deployment are dirty 
words, used mostly to describe the new BMC. Take Fine (2012:565) as an example: 
“a new Black elite [that] has benefitted from the processes of economic and social 
restructuring in a way that has been entirely parasitical and the exact antithesis of an 
aspiring indigenous, developmental bourgeoisie.” Southall (2013:1) too, has noted the 
pathologisation of the new Black middle class: and that the BMC been presented as 
“is essentially shallow, if not actually parasitic, and seems to lack the industrious and 
productive character which has traditionally been associated with its historic 
counterparts in, especially, European and American society.” Correspondingly, Krige 
(2012:21) has cautioned against the tendency to pathologise the BMC as this limits 
our understanding of the “historically constructed, multiple and complex meanings” 
of consumption.  
Within the above noted scholarship, few have explored the extent of BMC 
indebtedness and the positive and negative aspects of a financialised BMC. In Marxist 
terms we could ask about the pauperization of the Black middle class, who without 
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necessarily collapsing into the proletariat are proletarianised by the need to sell their 
labour into the future. 
1.6 Research objectives  
Various authors have argued that professionalization increases political 
participation and consciousness (Huntington, 1991; Lipset et al., 1993; Torres, 2000), 
thus establishing a positive correlation between wealth and democracy: the wealthier 
and more educated a society becomes, the more likely it will become democratic. 
Therefore, professionalization becomes translated into political resources and capital 
(Torres, 2000). More specifically, following Lipset et al., (1993), Rivero et al., 
(2003:7) argued that increased education and income combined with complex and 
interdependent work situations result in increased demands for political freedom. For 
Torres (2000:86) “wealth eases burdens, both individual and collective; education 
expands the number of professionals and the middle class, who are often perceived to 
be most sympathetic to democratic liberal ideals and the most sophisticated citizens.” 
In the South African case, this suggests that an educated and professional BMC could 
play an important role in the consolidation of democracy. 
However, the political role of the middle classes depends on interests and 
historical situations and the availability of class alliances – whether these are forged 
with the owners of production or the working classes and/or the lower classes 
(Wright, 1997; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992 in Southall, 2014:2). This 
study problematizes this. I acknowledge that the Black middle class has tended to 
show allegiance to the ANC. I also agree with the arguments posed by scholars such 
as Lipset and Rueschemeyer that an educated and income secure BMC may show 
greater demand for socio-political and more importantly, economic growth and 
stability, and question whether the ANC remains the party to achieve this.  
I therefore aim to formulate an understanding of the socio-political capacity of 
higher professionals, entrepreneurs and managers in the BMC, by examining the 
interaction between class, professional and socio-political identities. I ask: “how do 
middle class identities and location affect BMC political attitudes?” I thus have 
two interrelated research objectives that I qualitatively explore: 
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1. The meanings of being Black and middle class, and  
2. Political attitudes and activities of the professional Black middle class. 
Fundamentally, I hope to contribute a better understanding of the socio-political 
capacity of the Black middle class, and veer from the hitherto insipid cacophony in 
BMC scholarship.  
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Chapter 2: Theories of the middle class  
 Chapter 3: Methodology  
 Chapter 4: The meanings of being Black and middle class  
 Chapter 5: Political attitudes and activities of the professional Black middle 
class  
 Chapter 6: Discussion & Conclusion  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Theories of the Middle Class 
2.1 Introduction 
Theorists have admitted to the impossibility of an absolute definition of class 
(Poulantzas, 1974; Abercrombie & Urry, 1983). Indeed, there is theoretical 
divergence throughout history and across disciplines on what fundamentally 
constitutes class. Among the theorists that recognise the existence of a middle class, 
some construct it as relatively homogenous while others stratify it into varied 
segments. For the most part South African scholarship has applied both the neo-
Marxist and neo-Weberian approaches to the political, social, economic and identity 
treatments of class. Seekings (2008) explains that the period between 1949 and the 
early 1970s was dominated by Marxist approaches; and Greenstein (1998) reasons 
that this was due to the analytical congruity between apartheid capitalism and 
Marxism. On the other hand the neo-Weberian approach has come to dominate the 
post-1994 era. Other scholars have applied the subjective approach, opting for 
individual self-selection and placement (Collette, 2009; Alexander, Ceruti, Motseke, 
Phadi & Wale, 2013). 
This chapter presents neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian theoretical approaches to 
social class and the location of professionals and managers therein. 
2.2 The middle class in Marx 
With the study of the origins of capitalism as his primary concern, Marx 
postulated that the ownership and non-ownership of the means of production forms 
the basic determinant of class. The means of production are identified as land; labour 
power; buildings; capital; machinery; property. The ownership and non-ownership of 
the means of production affects the power structures of society. 
Marx asserted that in advanced capitalist societies, two main classes, polarised 
and in conflict with each other would emerge: the bourgeoisie as the owners of the 
means of production and the proletariat that possesses only its labour to sell (Marx, 
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1974). Placed between these two classes is the petty bourgeoisie or middle class that 
is made up of owners of small businesses and workshops, artisans, small 
manufacturers, landowners and office workers. The latter are intellectual workers 
involved in the production of surplus value and are non-productive labour, 
(Macdonald, 1995:36). Importantly, the middle class’s means of production is 
insufficient to permit the employment of hired labour. The movement within 
industrial capitalism towards even larger production would dispossess the middle 
class of whatever minimal means of production they owned. Thus, large scale 
production and capitalist competition eventually squeezes them out, and they become 
subject to proletarianisation. On the one hand, it seems to be suggested that as the 
working class becomes increasingly ‘dangerous’ and politically conscious, the middle 
class will align itself with the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, there are suggestions in 
Marx that the middle class would pledge its allegiance with the workers. 
Drawing from varied explanatory frameworks, neo-Marxists have attempted to 
explain the middle class that has, instead of collapsing, tended to increase in capitalist 
industrialist societies. Mallet (1975) and Poulantzas (1974, 1977) conceived of the 
two categories of the middle class: the traditional and new petty bourgeoisie made up 
of professionals and managers. Mallet argued that the new petty bourgeoisie formed a 
new segment within the working class as technological advancement and automation 
merged the manual and technical workers. Similarly, Braverman (1974) had argued 
that technological advancements in industrialised capitalist societies was narrowing 
and eliminating the differencing skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers in the 
production of commodities – particularly as the labour process was being broken up 
and simplified. Krause (1971:102) argued that increased automation and 
mechanisation would result in the de-skilling of office workers or white collar 
workers and lead to their proletarianisation and eventual expulsion from the labour 
market or work. For Ossowiski (1967:191-192) it was within the conditions of 
collapse and proletarianisation of the middle class that would result in the 
collectivisation of economic and political interests between the former middle class 
and worker. Krause (1971:103) reached a different conclusion though, stating that the 
new middle class would escape proletarianisation by using its political and consumer 
power to preserve itself.  
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Savage, Barlow, Dickens & Fielding (1992:2) reviewed the social sciences 
conception of the middle classes as social classes. They contend that neo-Marxists 
such as Wright (1978), Carchedi (1977), Abercrombie & Urry (1983), Carter (1985) 
and Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich (1979) have in various ways conceived of the middle 
class against the functions it undertakes for capital. For Poulantzas (1974) the new 
petty bourgeoisie performs authority and supervision over the production process and 
tends to monopolize knowledge. In Carchedi’s work for example, supervision and 
surveillance undertaken by the middle class for the capitalist class is explored; while 
Wright examined the control function the new middle class performed over the 
physical means of production, labour power and investment. Savage, Barlow, Dickens 
& Fielding (1992:3) concluded that Wright (1978), Carter (1985) and Braverman 
(1974) body of work has been better at explaining the role of managers in private 
industry, and less so that of professionals, administrators and the self-employed 
because of this sub-groups’ low participation in the manufacturing process. 
2.3 The middle class in Weber 
Weber has generally been used to explore the middle classes. Central to the 
Weberian approach has been the theorization of professionalization and the rise of 
managers and white-collar workers in modern industrial economies. The concept of 
multiple structures of social power in Weberian analysis of societal stratification is a 
key point that differentiates Weber from Marx. Weber established that societies are 
stratified according to three interrelated but distinct sources of power: class, 
status/prestige and parties - through which groups and individuals compete for scarce 
resources (Weber, 1946:181). Power is the ability of individuals or groups “to realise 
their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are 
participating in the action” (Weber, 1946: 160). The economic, social, political and 
legal terrains of society are the additional structural determinants through which 
power can be exerted. This is differentiated from Marx, as he argued that economic 
power determines the social, political and legal terrains of power, so that those who 
are economically dominant also exercise dominion over these.  
Status or prestige refers to the level of esteem or honour associated with social 
positions and the quality lifestyles of groups or individuals (Weber, 1946: 186-7). 
Status groups are located in the social order, and share similar lifestyles, values and 
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identity, and can be constituted according to occupations, religion, ethnicity or party 
affiliation. Status groups may possess some form of social power, e.g. derived from 
class position, but power is not the only basis for honour or prestige. Sources of social 
power differentiate the social location of classes. So, while an individual may possess 
economic power in the form of capital and/or property, he/she may lack prestige, 
illustrating the distinctness/separation of the social and economic orders in society. 
Therefore, Weber established that prestige is distinguishable from power, but can be 
associated with it.  
Parties are structures located in the social or legal realm or the state, and are 
concerned with acquiring social power. This is one of the reasons that parties can only 
exist in socialised settings where a rational order exists, and they can thus plan 
communal action on the basis thereof. They seek to influence policies and make 
decisions on behalf of their membership in the political order, which may be classes 
and/or status groups (Weber, 1946: 194-5). Parties range from political parties, trade 
unions, church or religious groups and so on.  
Similar to Marx, Weber determined that in capitalist societies, property and the lack 
of property formed the basic category of “all class situations” (Weber, 1946:181). But 
unlike Marx, Weber’s exposition of capitalism emphasised a combination of features: 
“rationality, the capitalist spirit, and formally free markets in capital, labour, goods, 
services and raw materials” (Macdonald, 1995:36). In free markets, class situations 
are reflected by market position, which denotes the ability to translate goods, skills 
and/or services into income in the free commodity or labour markets (Weber, 
1946:181).  
According to Weber, the fault or benefit of birth, combined with education 
facilitates the ability to translate skills, and/or services and commodities into an 
income determined an individual’s life chances. The concept of social mobility is 
inherent in Weber’s life chances exposition. Individuals have the opportunity to 
change their class position through the competitive possession of education, which 
can be translated into an income, or the ownership of commodities/property. 
Individuals who share similar life-chances, a common position in the market 
economy, and who derive similar economic rewards constitute a class. “Classes are 
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not communities; they merely represent possible, and frequent, bases for communal 
action” (Weber, 1946:181-2).  
Unlike Marx, Weber defined the middle class quite substantially. He argued 
that as the productive capacity and specialisation of tasks expanded under capitalism, 
so did the opportunity for individuals to derive an income. Hence there followed the 
emergence of the middle classes: propertyless intelligentsia and specialists. 
Professionals, senior managers and administrators undertake specialised tasks within 
the production & labour processes of enterprises and state bureaucracies. The middle 
class is distinguished from other classes on the basis of its superior market situation 
and life chances – members have qualifications and are credentialed, and are thus 
highly rewarded. For Weber, the middle class is politically neutral, and is a 
perpetually vacillating group caught between the class struggle of the capitalist and 
proletarian classes. From this postulation, Weber identified four class categories: the 
propertied upper class, the propertyless white-collar workers, the petty bourgeoisie 
(small property owners) and the manual working class who are un-credentialed, semi-
skilled and unskilled. Weber’s upper middle class comprises higher professionals, 
lower professionals and managers as separate groups.  
2.4 The professions as the contemporary middle class  
The professions are recognised as the fastest growing sector of the 
occupational structure. This growth has profoundly shifted stratification analyses, 
evident in the above-noted revisions of Marxist explications of the middle class. The 
expansion of the welfare bureaucratic state, advancements in information and 
technology and the expansion of multi-national corporations have resulted in the 
growth of professions (Weber, 1946; Macdonald, 1995). Additionally, resulting from 
technological innovation, new types of occupations have exploded into the market 
alongside the traditional professions in medicine, commerce and law. Thus, 
professions as knowledge-based occupations have both been seen as producers and 
products of industrialisation, as their skills and knowledge are regarded as essential 
for the development and expansion of industrial economies (Haralambos & Holborn, 
1995). 
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As with most subjects in the social sciences, there are multiple definitions of 
professions. Ritzer (1975:630) helpfully identified three sociological approaches to 
defining the professions: structural, processual and power. Associated with Talcott 
Parsons, the structural approach provides a taxonomic approach that outlines a list of 
static characteristics that an occupation must possess in order to be regarded as a 
profession. The basic characteristics of a profession are outlined as: body of 
theoretical knowledge; some degree of professional autonomy; an ethic that members 
enforce and accountability to society (Macdonald, 1995). Ritzer sees the structural 
approach as ahistorical since it ascribes static characteristics to professions in contra-
distinction to occupations. The processual approach can be divided into two: action 
and power approaches. In the processual approach, for which Wilensky (1964) is 
prominent, occupations mature through various stages before being recognised as 
professions, ibid. Wilensky also recognised medicine, law, engineering and science as 
the classic professions. Ritzer explains that the power approach, argued more 
prominently by Freidson (1970) is a relatively modern approach that emphasises 
monopoly over work tasks and a dominant position in the division of labour. 
Importantly the power approach remains congruent with and encompasses the two 
afore-mentioned approaches.  
With these approaches in mind, Carter and Wilson’s (2006) definition of a 
profession as an occupation that requires extensive training, the study and mastery of 
specialized knowledge is processual. A profession thus requires accreditation, 
certification, or licensing. Structurally, it is governed by a specific code of ethics, 
norms, standards and rules that control and hold members accountable. There are 
three segments in the professional group: higher, lower and managers. Higher 
professionals require extensive training, the study and mastery of specialised 
knowledge, accreditation, certification or licensing. Furthermore, they are held to a 
specific code of ethics to which they are held accountable (Macdonald, 1995; Carter 
& Wilson, 2006). As part of the middle class, higher professionals occupy an 
advantageous location in terms of prestige, conditions of employment, roles and 
income – they are the higher professionals, senior managers, administrators, and 
successful business people in the areas of medicine, law, science and engineering, the 
clergy and academia. Lower professionals are the teachers, nurses, social workers, 
librarians, etc. (Haralambos & Holborn, 1995).  
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Neo-Weberian theories on the professions emphasise the action approach, 
while neo-Marxists emphasise the power approach. Autonomy is a fundamental tenet 
for professions that encompasses both the action and power approaches, and 
professionals control professionals through professional bodies. Autonomy is closely 
linked to professional power, which is the ability to influence or persuade decision-
makers to act in ways that are congruent with whatever desired outcomes 
(Macdonald, 1995). Professional bodies are therefore instrumental in maintaining the 
power of professions. They do this by upholding professional autonomy, controlling 
and regulating entry into the professions: thus creating a monopoly on knowledge. So 
occupations in seeking to professionalize work to secure, enhance, maintain the social 
and economic standing of its members, and achieve a relative advantage in the 
structure of inequality (Macdonald, 1995:36). 
Within the power approach, neo-Marxists see professions utilising political 
and social processes to secure and reproduce privileged positions in society. Thus, 
professions may use their relationship with the state or governments to reproduce and 
maintain a privilege position in society. Strong relationships with the state are 
maintained as they require their existence to be legitimized by law. From the neo-
Weberian perspective, professional closure as the control of supply of professionals 
which is also legitimised by law, maintains the high levels of demand and reward for 
professional services; high status and privileged terms and conditions of work. The 
action approach therefore emphasise the influence that professionals have in shaping 
the organisations and environments within which they operate. The requirement for 
extensive and specialised training and qualification is also a form of professional 
closure. On the other hand, while Marxists’ view professional power as exercised in 
order to counteract the threat of de-professionalisation and proletarianisation, neo-
Weberians see professions acting to perpetuate greater autonomy, self-direction and a 
dominant position in the division of labour (Freidson, 1983). This is because 
professional status is important and actively pursued via individual and collective 
action rather than macro-structural influences. Neo-Weberians therefore emphasise 
the ability and extent of influence of professionals in bureaucratic or corporate 
settings.  
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Evetts (2003) outlined the challenges that professions face in maintaining 
autonomy, power and prestige. For example, professions have faced reductions in 
their autonomy and dominance, as well as the ability to exercise occupational control 
(Freidson, 1988, 1994 in Macdonald, 1995). Professionalism and professional work 
has been given to change as professionals have, over-time worked in employing 
organisations: professional service firms (PSFs); international and commercial 
organisations. One of the results of this has been the dilution of professionals’ 
occupational control and decision-making over their work (ibid). Evetts (2003:396) 
takes the growth of professions, professionalization and professionalism as positive. 
Using the structural definition of professions she outlines two ways in which 
professionalism has been defined – either as a normative value or an ideological 
system of control. She states: - 
The most obvious difference is that while professionalism as value system is 
guardedly optimistic about the positive contributions of the concept to a 
normative social order, professionalism as ideology focuses more negatively 
on professionalism as a hegemonic belief system and mechanism of social 
control for ‘professional’ workers (Evetts, 2003:396). 
It returns to professionalism as an occupational value but in this 
interpretation professionalism is ideological and used as a means of 
practitioner/employee control. The discourse of professionalism is taken over, 
reconstructed and used as an instrument of managerial control in 
organizations, where professionals are employed (Evetts, 2011:410). 
In assessing how the normative value or an ideological system of control play 
out Evetts (2003:409) states that in some settings or organisations, professionalism is 
imposed by employers and managers on professionals, even when professionals 
simply want to carry out the normative values of professionalism (e.g.: dedicated 
service or autonomous decision-making). These “values are inserted or imposed and a 
false or selective ideology is used to promote and facilitate occupational change and 
as a disciplinary mechanism …” (Evetts, 2003:409). This validates the 1970s and 80s 
neo-Weberian analysis which dismissed normative claims of professionalism as ways 
for maintaining professional monopolies. It is not all negative as she does recognise 
that in some instances the occupation is using the ideology partly in its own 
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occupational and practitioner interests but sometimes also as a way of promoting and 
protecting the public interest. 
2.5 Definitional approaches to BMC in South Africa 
The occupational determination of middle class membership has gained credence in 
the social sciences, as the sociology of occupations has now come to overlap with 
social stratification (Pavalko, 1971). Therefore occupation, in combination with 
education and income has commonly been used as a measure, descriptor and locator 
of class. This is because in modern, industrial and capitalist markets, skills and 
credentials have become property that is exchangeable for income and privilege 
(Macdonald, 1995:37). Note however that Nolutshungu’s (1982:51) caveat is 
important to remember: those uninvolved in physical production are not necessarily 
classless. 
South African scholarship has followed this, using variations of neo-Marxist and neo-
Weberian sociological approaches. This has resulted in wide-grouping of middle class 
occupations. In applying the neo-Weberian occupational approach to class 
stratification, the middle class would thus consist of a diverse group of salaried 
workers; ranging from secretaries to accountants, shop-assistants to managers, 
shopkeepers to social workers. In fact this has been the major challenge in middle 
class scholarship in South Africa, where the diversity of salaried workers is 
extraordinarily wide (Crankshaw, 1995). Coburn (1994) regards white-collar workers, 
managers and technical managers as forming the middle class. Davies (1979) as cited 
by Crankshaw had a similar definition, as the employment categories of the middle 
class are the managerial, executive and administrative; professional, semi-
professional and technical; and the clerical and sales. However, Crankshaw (1995) 
highlighted a huge flaw in this approach by stating that the ‘clerical and sales’ 
employment category was widely diverse, ranging from, stockbroker to petrol 
attendant. Schulz-Herzenberg (2009b) added entrepreneurs who fall in the tradition 
middle class under Marx as part of the contemporary middle class.  
Schlemmer’s (2005:2-3) middle class stratum comprises – the upper, middle and 
lower middle classes. The upper middle class is made up of senior executives of large 
businesses, highly ranked professionals: judges, surgeons, and others who tend to earn 
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very high fees rather than salaries, and very senior administrators in the public and 
semi-public sectors. The middle-middle class is made up of middle-level executives, 
owners of medium sized businesses or small businesses that are capital, technology or 
knowledge intensive, salaried professionals, and the middle management levels of the 
public and semi-public sectors. The lower middle class is made up of small business 
people, clerical and sales workers at responsible levels, modestly paid salaried 
professionals such as school teachers and nurses, technicians and skilled non-manual 
service personnel. This study looks at higher professionals working as professionals, 
managers or entrepreneurs within the public and private sectors. 
As a result of the variation in defining and sub-divisions made of the middle class in 
South Africa, which range from mixing occupation and income, or estimates based on 
occupational categories; or uses of measurements of living standards, the estimations 
and calculation of the size of the Black middle class also vary widely.  
2.6 Theoretical framework 
The definitional approaches taken in this study have been outlined in chapter one. 
To recap, this study was informed by the neo-Weberian approach to social 
stratification wherein individuals’ occupational position in the labour market was 
taken as the signifier of class position. Thus, Black professionals, inclusive of those 
working as managers or entrepreneurs in the public and private sectors, were 
identified as a segment of the middle class. Thus, this study avoided definitional 
pitfalls by applying Schlemmer’s categorisations of the middle class and selecting two 
groups therein. The first are higher professionals as part of the upper-middle class that 
work as lawyers, doctors, accountants, engineers, IT managers/consultants, either as 
entrepreneurs or managers. The second are middle-middle class made up of middle-
level executives, owners of medium sized businesses or small businesses that are 
capital, technology or knowledge intensive, salaried professionals, and the middle 
management levels of the public and semi-public sectors. 
More importantly, this disaggregation and specificity of this study allows it to move 
away from the treatment of the Black middle class as a homogenous group, and 
allows for depth in the analysis of its political attitudes and activities.   
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CHAPTER THREE  
Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
In the social sciences, concepts such as race, class and political attitudes are 
epistemologically complex and contested. In this case, the study thereof demands 
highly refined research techniques capable of providing descriptive and/or 
explanatory analyses of the relationships that may exist between these concepts.  
As illustrated in chapter one, South African scholarship focuses on questioning 
the legitimacy and the unintended consequences of the ANC government’s socio-
economic policies and programmes, to which the expansion of the new BMC is 
attributed. On the other hand, we see that the ANC showers itself with praise for this 
expansion. It is within this context that this study took place. 
This research asked how the professional and class identities shaped political 
attitudes. Framed by this question, I applied the qualitative research design because of 
its idiographic focus with the aim of providing fuller explanations (de Vaus, 2001:22). 
Therefore, this was a qualitative exploration of how Black middle class professionals 
construct their professional and political identities. In so doing, I sought to outline the 
meanings Black professionals ascribe to being Black and middle class. I further 
sought to outline their political ideas and activities. I sought to examine and outline 
the factors that affect political participation.  
3.2 Sampling 
The sampling process involves the identification and selection of units or 
segments of a population to which the research question applies. This therefore forms 
the motivation for sampling. Successful sampling enables us to generalize the 
research results onto the general population from which the sample derives (Babbie, 
2007). Qualitative research involves rich and vivid descriptions of people’s words and 
actions within the environment being studied. Therefore, qualitative samples are 
typically small in size and can range from one to fifteen people on average. Sampling 
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methods thus guide researchers on how to appropriately select segments or units of 
the population geared towards answering the research question.  
Therefore, guided by the above-stated theoretical framework I applied non-probability 
sampling through the purposive sampling technique and snowballed therefrom. This 
therefore enabled a heterogeneous sample of the Black middle class; wherein 
managers, professionals and entrepreneurs across different sectors participated in the 
study. 
3.3 Research design & methods  
According to Coffey & Atkinson (1996:26) qualitative analyses begins with the 
identification of themes and patterns. In applying the qualitative research design a 
number of research techniques were combined to construct the meanings that the 
professional Black middle class attaches to its middle class and political identities. 
Most notably, these included interviews and focus groups discussions as the key 
methods for the study (Fouche & de Vos, 2005:133). These were consensually audio-
recorded. I was also allowed to take notes. 
Interviews are conversations that are discovery-oriented as they “give us access to the 
observation of others” wherein we can explore respondent’s points of view, feelings, 
thoughts and perspectives (Weiss, 1994:1). In the research process they are capable of 
producing detailed descriptions, help show how respondents interpret different events 
and situations ibid. As a research method, interviews are varied, some are 
standardised and closed; others are open-ended (Weiss, 1994). In between these, is the 
semi-structured interview that was applied in this study, which breaks uniformity in 
the conversations and allowed for concentration on “matters on which the respondent 
is especially able to report” (Weiss, 1994:49). Informed by this, and Janesick’s (2000) 
idea of improvisation, I used the semi-structured interview. 
Focus groups are similar to group discussions and interviews as they allow the 
gathering of participants’ attitudes, experiences and opinions. In addition, as Janesick 
(2000) discovered, they open up a space in which the researcher can observe the 
interactions among the research participants. Thus, researchers are able to observe the 
symbolic interaction – wherein individual’s self-concepts and images are built up, 
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reinforced or modified in the process of interaction with other members of society 
(Kitzinger’s (1995). As with Kitzinger’s (1995) and Morgan’s (1988, 1996) outline of 
the advantages of a focus group, the BMC participants interacted with each other, 
explored and challenged each other’s views on various BMC issues. They also of 
course challenged me as the researcher about my study of the BMC at all.  
3.3.1 In-depth interviews  
Semi-structured interviews with higher-professionals were conducted. The semi-
structured interviews were structured into personal, political and contextual themes. 
They were asked what it meant to be middle class was asked, and how they align 
themselves with those personally constructed meaning. These questions were then 
followed by personal and contextual explanations of their political and professional 
identities. Interviews were thus organized in this way: - 
 Personal biography – whether interviewees saw themselves as part of the middle 
class; their ascribed meanings of being middle class.  
 Professional biography – the types of work and organisations they have worked at. 
 Political biography – activity in politics, what politics means to them, how they 
influence the political sphere through their work, if there is a distinction between their 
professional identity and political identity. 
Table 1: Professionals Interviewed 
Professionals  # Date  
Lawyer 1 05-04-2014 
Chartered Accountants  3 
 CA 1: 01-10-2013 
 CA 2: 01-10-2013 
 CA 3: 24-07-2014 
Economist 1 26-03-2014 
Specialist Surgeon 1 08-05-2015 
Research executive 1 24-07-2014 
IT executives 2 
 IT Exec 1: 16-09-2014 
 IT Exec 2: 17-09-2014 
Engineering Consultant 1 07-04-2014 
Total  10 
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3.3.2 Focus group discussions 
In addition three focus groups in the provinces of Gauteng, Eastern and Western Cape 
were held with members of the Black middle class: professionals, managers and 
entrepreneurs. All the focus groups were mixed sex and took 2 to 3 hours. Guided by 
a focus group schedule (which is appended) these focus groups explored how 
members of the Black middle class construct their middle class identity for which this 
study extracts in order to build an understanding thereof. I organized and facilitated 
the focus groups. However, in the East London focus group part-time students 
studying with the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Fort 
Hare for a Masters in African studies and working as managers and senior 
administrators in the various departments of the state were invited and participated in 
the focus group. Nonetheless, I remained the facilitator for it. 
Table 2: Focus groups conducted 
Focus Groups  # Date  
Johannesburg (5 participants) 1 10-07-2013 
East London (22 participants) 1 15-07-2013 
Cape Town (12 participants) 1 11-09-2013 
Total 3 
As a facilitator of these discussions I was able to observe and participate in the 
discussion – exploring, constructing and trying to understand what it meant to be 
Black and middle class. The material obtained from these discussions have greatly 
deepened my understanding of the multiple meanings and constructions of being 
Black and middle class, and in this way have helped to sharpen my understanding in 
this study.  
3.4 Qualitative data analysis 
Taking into account South Africa’s complex social formation process, it is difficult, if 
not short sighted, to confine oneself to a single theoretical exposition of class. 
Seekings (2008:4) cites Crompton’s (2008) advice that the plurality and divergence of 
theoretical approaches on class can be combined in a single study. This can be done 
even in the case where such approaches appear incompatible or even contradictory. 
Therefore, in addition to the neo-Weberian approach, I turn to the theoretical 
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expositions from neo-Marxism in analysing the professional and political attitudes of 
the Black middle class. In addition, this approach is informed by the understanding 
offered by Nolutshungu (1982:51), of the necessity to recognise that ideology has an 
important effect on the total meaning of class, and in the Marxist sense, that the study 
of class is about understanding the social, economic and political aspects that make up 
modern society. The combination of material and cultural aspects from Marx and 
Weber enable an analysis of the varied intersections, interconnections and 
interdependences between race, class, gender, professional and political attitudes.  
Qualitative analysis involves the selection of procedures that enable the organization 
of masses of data into parts that fit into a broader and structured whole (de Wet & 
Erasmus 2005:28). Janesick (2000:390) makes a similar observation stating that data 
presentation in qualitative studies must be balanced by interpretive analysis that 
exposes the meanings constructed in the study. This study applies interpretive 
analysis, which is a “consideration of ‘things’ within their context and the subjective 
meanings that people bring to their situation (de Vaus, 2001:9-10). However, de Vaus 
(2001:5) also provides caution stating that because human behaviour is always 
constrained by structures within which people live, researchers can only reach 
probabilistic explanations in opposition to deterministic ones. I used thematic analysis 
to interpret my data.  
3.4.1 Thematic analysis 
This is a flexible method that is commonly used in other qualitative analysis 
approaches. It allows for the description of a topic or event through the thematic 
categorization of verbal, behavioural or documented data. It enables the identification 
and extraction of patterns within the data and the development of themes therefrom. 
Deductive and inductive approaches are used in identifying themes, in which the latter 
refers to the data itself is used to derive a structure of analysis. I used inductive 
analysis after I had applied the deductive approach since my instruments were 
arranged into themes relating to my research question. I underwent the 6 different 
phases involved in thematic analysis.  
Familiarization – this stage is also called immersion. The researcher thus began by 
reading and re-reading the transcripts and extracting patterns. In this way, I began to 
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make sense of the issues arising out of the data. I structured these into a table with lots 
of text for all the focus groups and interviews. From this text, I began to generate my 
first level of codes. This stage is usually called the data reduction phase. From these 
tables I began a refinement process, where I extracted the data that directly responded 
to my research questions. I then searched, identified and explained the emergent 
themes, and in this way the all the transcripts began merging or coming together. 
After this, I reviewed the themes and constructed the final themes. In this way, I was 
able to construct two chapters that describe and analyse the findings at the same time. 
In presenting the data, I refer to all the participants of the study as discussants. 
3.5 Ethical issues  
People signed and gave verbal consent to being interviewed. Limitations of the study  
There is one significant limitation to the study that is apparent to me. Given the highly 
politicised nature of the local government, and multiple media reports about 
corruption and such and such, respondents may be reticent or exaggerate what is 
happening. To some extent, this is limited by the verifying the standing of the 
municipality, through annual financial statements from the Auditor General. But it 
remains that the interpretation of professionalism and political attitudes is highly 
subjective.  
Retrospective questions can also be used in order to gather information about the 
dynamics of change (Torres, 2000:101). Retrospective questions do, however, present 
a whole set of other problems like bad memory, etc. especially in periods of intense, 
rapid change.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
Meanings of being Black and middle class 
4.1 Introduction 
In what follows, this chapter draws heavily on the focus group discussions with 
entrepreneurs, managers and professionals in the public and private sectors to map 
the meanings of being Black and middle class, and to a lesser extent, the interview 
material with higher professionals is also included. The meanings of being BMC 
are important in foregrounding this group’s political attitudes, which is discussed 
in the next chapter.  
Overall, while discussions on being middle class were firmly pegged on being 
Black, there were distinct differences in the framing of class experiences by 
discussants in this study. There were discernible differences across the three 
provinces in the way that discussants framed their class experiences. In 
Johannesburg (JHB), the gendered dimensions the interaction thereof with class 
mobility, race and culture emerged strongly. For example, that Black women were 
‘outsourcing’ their parenting responsibilities to “nannies” while Black men were 
feeling emasculated by successful female corporate wives or partners. In the East 
London (EL) discussion, class mobility in the context of acute poverty; as well as 
a politicised rejection of the middle class identity were major highlights. Many 
spoken to here still lived in the townships, unlike in Johannesburg and Cape Town 
(CT), while some lived in old middle class white suburbs. In Johannesburg and 
Cape Town, discussants were transient township visitors. In Cape Town race 
mattered more than class, it was first being Black and then second being middle 
class, thus the discussion was firmly rooted in being Black and middle class. This 
was particularly exposed when participants spoke of employment and business 
opportunities, and choosing a suburb to live in. The highlight was that private 
sector employment and advancement was racially organised, first it was the white 
person followed by the coloured guy to share what is left, and for the Black 
person it is said “manage that one.” Residence in the city is seen as closed off to 
Black people or “locals,” where one male participant spoke of the surprise he was 
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met with when he went to view a flat to rent: “I didn’t think, you just don’t sound 
Black.” 
4.2 Racialised & commercialised objects of curiosity 
Kuper’s (1965) criticism of the exoticising attention imposed on the old BMC: 
‘as if their existence were proof of Africans’ evolution’ remains cogent, as broad 
based attention on the BMC’s wealth, patterns of consumption, style of dress, and 
moderating or revolutionary tendencies continues today. As with the UCT Black 
diamonds study, it has become far more prevalent to quantify and qualify the 
commercial and consumption patterns and power of the emergent BMC. 
Correspondingly, the origins and drivers of BMC emergence and expansion; their 
aspirations and realities, media and product consumption form the subject of such 
studies. Khunou (2015:90) has also criticised such BMC framing for “the 
experience of the Black middle class to an undifferentiated mass of conspicuous 
consumers.” In response, BMC individuals have treated this interest with deep 
suspicion and contempt: - 
… How class in South Africa has been used for various types of 
manipulation. … Why else would we classify people if we don’t want to 
manipulate them? … If not to exclude other people, so that [X] and I are 
a group that looks better than, or the other group gets pity because 
they’re less than the middle class? - CT FG. 
Another CT discussant argued that within the broader South African 
middle class, the BMC has been made an “object of curiosity, something to study 
and examine, to be picked apart, to be figured out, like ‘ooh look what it does, 
look what it says, what it is’ and for me that plays into the history of how 
Blackness has always been an object of curiosity: ‘ooh look, what is Blackness 
doing now?’ Black is always other” and as such the BMC is “overrepresented in 
terms of being studied.”  
In the Johannesburg discussion another discussant observed that the BMC has 
been “incorrectly portrayed” by “marketing companies and everybody else.” In 
television adverts depict Black women are seen only “when [they] are in the 
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kitchen cleaning” alongside other racist and sexist depictions of them as 
“jiving gogos” in expression of  the “whole joke about the big mamas,” resulting 
in the questioning of “who the hell thought this up?” and a response that “it's all 
white people writing the stories.”  
The discussants lamented the hyper-consumption, or consumer citizens 
popularly known as the Black diamonds, stating that such societal depictions had 
turned the BMC into “consumers, this insatiable monster that just consumes 
material. Yet, we don’t even say anything.” This is a response to the commercial 
appropriation of the Black political struggle to sell their products; where: -  
But we keep quiet about the message. … Johnny Walker decided ‘no, we 
are going to piss on the struggle.’ You know what they did? They have an 
advert where Mandela is walking out of jail and you're thinking, ‘wow, 
beautiful thing.’ And then there is the moment at FNB stadium where we 
are voting – it's 1994 and 1995 … walking up … and then suddenly you 
have a bloody Walker, a Johnny bloody Walker. … Pissing on our struggle. 
Like literally pissing - JHB FG.  
One result was a discussant decidedly abdicating her middle class position 
as a mechanism of distancing herself from commercialised constructions of the 
BMC. This is reminiscent of the old BMC that abrogated middle class labels as a 
proxy of distancing itself from the apartheid state: - 
I don't classify myself as middle class. And actually when this whole 
middle class thing started, I actually thought ‘but I mean this is nonsense, 
why must we now start categorising ourselves?’ … I will probably be put 
in the middle class category by whatever … specs are put. Like maybe 
that I have a house or whatever, but I don't see myself as middle class. … 
I don't want to place myself in there - JHB FG. 
BMC discussants recognised that as a class they were collectively silent, and 
tended to protest at the individualistically. One discussant felt that it was 
necessary to “take that space as Black people and speak for ourselves.”  
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4.3 Class mobility: The race & class nexus  
While Schulz-Herzenberg argued that South Africa was increasingly being 
characterised by varied social identities and value system,  Schlemmer had earlier 
argued that the BMC lacked internal coherence and identity cohesion. This finding 
was later reinforced by Khunou & Krige (2013) wherein they argued that the BMC 
struggled to reconcile its class and racial identity. In a more nuanced analysis, 
Modisha (2006:59) offered that the struggle to reconcile class positions was based on 
social status meanings, so while managers in his study categorically belonged to the 
BMC, they rejected that location because many other Black people were not part of 
the BMC. Similar to Modisha, I argue that the high levels of intra-racial inequality 
bond the BMC to race-based alliances rather than class-based alliances.  
Discussants were first asked what middle class meant, second if they saw 
themselves as part of that middle class. In general, both neo-Marxist and neo-
Weberian ascriptions of the middle class were identified in responding to the first 
question, while neo-Marxist understandings were sometimes utilised to disrupt 
middle class location. Overall, the findings herein illustrate that the BMC applies 
multiple explanatory contexts to explain its identity and location. For some 
discussants identity is first taken as Black: an immutable identity, and second: 
middle class: a tenuous, precarious and inadequate position, making them Black 
and middle class. For example, similar to Khunou’s (2013) findings, some 
discussants were reluctant to identify as middle class. 
This research illustrates the prevalence of a Weber’s (1948) exposition of the 
utility of education and skills in the market place, first in delineating its 
parameters and second in explanations of class mobility. Discussants explained 
that the middle class was about “possession” and the extent thereof; the ability of 
“education” to “change your class into middle class;” or “money’s” ability to get 
business people “out of the lower class.” Therefore education, money and 
business were instrumental for class mobility. 
I think if one approaches this aspect of being [middle class], from a 
historical point of view, it will always refer to a person who is in the 
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middle in terms of having a job; in terms of having a salary that you earn; 
in terms of being educated - EL FG.  
It’s the professionals; it is people with qualification[s] and above, 
degrees, diplomas, very scarce ones. … They are able to shoot in the 
higher class, up into the middle class. Highly skilled individuals that earn 
better salaries, they are more secured skill wise. I am qualified, I can do 
it. … The source of income difference, if I group [them] they earn about 
R25, 000 upwards in terms of affordability. You can class them according 
to their salary range as well - IT Executive 1, JHB.  
The middle class means the professionals, as the 5% or 10% of the 
richest of South Africa. People that have a profession that they can 
attribute a skill to … Individuals that are white-collar [and] individuals 
that can afford to employ another person … - IT Executive 2, JHB. 
From above it is clear that class mobility resulted from and in income, which 
therefore enabled affordability. Thus, education and skills, income and concomitantly 
affordability, and importantly, the extent of affordability became the indispensable 
factors in delineating or defining the middle class parameters, a finding that reinforces 
Phadi & Ceruti’s (2011) assertions. In addition, because education enabled class 
mobility, it was a strong value and “everything” for many of the BMC discussants.  
From a neo-Marxist perspective, one discussant explained that the instruments of 
class mobility – education, occupation and income – disrupted the “political” location 
of being working class: -  
In some perspectives it differs. Like politically, for example, because if 
you've got money, then your status becomes debated and it means you 
cannot be regarded as being poor … Then it means politically you 
become somebody else – EL FG. 
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I work, I earn an income. You can call me middle class. But I align myself 
to workers. I earn an income because I am a worker. This makes me 
working class. Politically I am a working class person – EL FG.  
These statements reflect a tension between the race and class identity tropes, and 
may be construed as a BMC that struggles to reconcile its class and racial identities. 
However, this repeated finding may, instead, be suggesting that occupation and 
income as class markers do not automatically translate into a class identities. That is, 
from a measurement perspective – it is possible to locate individuals into the middle 
class, but this does not necessarily translate into class identity.  
Furthermore, these statements suggest the resilience of a political and working 
class identity of the 70s and 80s. They suggest continuity in class and belonging, 
wherein the old BMC identified with the working class and assumed the same 
political identity (Southall, 1980). It further confirms Mdletyana’s (2014) assertion 
that the BMC carries the working class’s cultural values and practices. The working 
class denotes a racial category in South Africa, therefore, identity constructions along 
the working class lines dovetails with racial and Black solidarity. Therefore it is less 
that the BMC struggles to reconcile its class and racial identity as suggested 
Schlemmer, 2005; Modisha, 2006 and Khunou, 2013. Instead of this common 
understanding, it seems more possible that segments of the new BMC have an identity 
that is historically defined and continues today. One that may in fact be reinforced by 
the continued economic dominance of white capital. 
4.4 Affordability & the mutability of middle class location 
But what of belonging? Belonging to the middle class is attained through 
affordability, but affordability is disrupted by status and education. The next 
section discusses the two. As with Phadi & Ceruti’s (2011) findings, affordability 
and its extent was a crucial factor in determining the parameters of the middle 
class and belonging. Affordability therefore meant the ability to meet the expenses 
of the “basic” necessities of life or the “trappings of middle class life” such as a 
house; car; food; private education for their children; a holiday and credit. 
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I am middle class; I can afford a car, house, except luxury, like an aircraft, 
R5m house, a boat. The rest I can afford: fees, small house – CA, Durban. 
What I want I can afford. I have a house and car. Go to Mauritius, I’ve got 
a plan. Nothing really is beyond my reach – Lawyer, JHB. 
The guys that can afford to qualify for a house, car, credit. To go on 
holiday. To have appropriate life. …Individuals that can go for 6 months 
without having a job and still have enough to keep them going – IT 
Executive 2, JHB. 
An important distinction from Phadi & Ceruti’s findings was the extent of 
affordability and presence of disposable income after the basic needs noted above 
had been met: “because from where I stand, I think a middle class is someone that 
is able to pay his or her bills and still have money to enjoy life.” Therefore, the 
ability to consume luxury items such as overseas holidays and privately provided 
services such as education and healthcare and type of residential area were key 
distinguishing factors in Black middle class life and belonging, and indicate 
different levels of middle class location. Interestingly, one IT executive added the 
ability to choose and work where he desired as a measure of being middle class.  
I do consider myself that [middle class], because I am pretty much am 
able to do the things that I have defined, I am able to live, own multiple 
cars, I can choose where I wanna live, or work. I have chosen where I 
wanna work – IT Executive 2, JHB. 
I really can’t imagine that because somebody has achieved their basic 
needs, that they’re middle class. I really think that would be to degrade 
the kind of quality that as individuals we should be pursuing. Because, 
just because I have shelter, regardless of the quality of that shelter, just 
because I have money … - CT FG.  
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4.4.1 Residence 
Residential location was used to determine working, middle and upper class 
location; wherein for some, living in the township instead of a suburb meant not being 
middle class: “I said I'm not middle class because I live in the township, I live in 
Langa” and “I don't consider myself the middle class. I'm still poor. I live in the 
township. To me people are middle class when they live in the suburbs.” There were 
distinctions on the type or location of suburbs that people lived in, for example, for 
one lawyer living in “Sandhurst and Westcliff is upper class,” and “the elites.” 
Therefore the quality of life was essential in defining middle class belonging. 
The choice of a lifestyle and the extent of affordability were therefore the 
distinguishing factors for middle class belonging; where the conditions for middle 
class location have been met, however, individuals abdicate or choose against it. 
This is in tandem with Nzimande (1991:275) emphasis that “classes are not 
merely 'objective' categories, but that they carry within them a baggage of 
subjective experiences.” This may be governed by different set of values that 
drive choices: 
He has 3 masters [degrees], he is a teacher, but he lives in the township. 
But he chose to live a lower level life, the township life. You fit the class 
but you are not living the class - IT Executive 1, JHB. 
Because there are people who are very wealthy, and they do live in 
neighbourhoods which someone would categorise as being less than, or 
not where the wealthy live… But they choose to live there maybe 
because of family or they have an affinity to the area and so they are 
comfortable. That happens all over the world – CT FG. 
I fit the class, but maybe some other people they say I am lowering 
myself. I am not living the lifestyle. These guys they tend to buy fancy 
house, they go overseas, they are following another category of the 
African culture. I haven’t familiarise myself to it. I stay in in a townhouse 
in a suburb; I haven’t bought those big houses, the big estate houses, 
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those luxury in your face and stuff. I haven’t decided to choose that. I go 
on overseas trips, but not as often as them. My friends go every year, but 
I don’t. And hence, when you sit with the other person, it display[s] you 
as ‘you have.’ I am not the materialistic guy. The time will come, but at 
this stage, no not yet - IT Executive 1, JHB. 
Just as affordability placed individuals in the middle class, the lack thereof also 
dislocated, tempered or made middle class belonging tenuous.  
I mean we cannot afford certain things and with middle class comes the 
status of being able to afford - EL FG. 
I am an aspirant middle class because I cannot today decide that, ‘oh, it's 
such a beautiful weekend, a weekend in my holiday flat in Cape Town 
would do.’ To me that's middle class and my savings are not enough and 
my retirement annuity is not enough for me to say: ‘bye government, 
thank you for the job.’ I can't. And my sense of accomplishment is not at 
a point where I can do certain things without even giving a second 
thought to it. But, having said that, I say I'm aspirant middle class 
because I always love, I say to my colleagues do your hair where you can 
sue. Do you hair where you can take them to the cleaners – GP FG. 
This view illustrates two things related to being middle class: aspiration to 
consolidate and extend middle class position or move into a higher rung within the 
middle class. Also, it is clear from this discussant that leaving work would truncate 
her current position within the middle class because of a loss of income. 
4.4.2 Status & middle class belonging  
So, while an individual may possess economic power in the form of capital and/or 
property, they may lack prestige; therefore illustrating the distinctness/separation of 
the social and economic orders in society as Weber (1948) explained. Affordability 
and disposable income confirmed or disrupted middle class belonging. Yet, status 
emerged as an important indicator of middle class belonging: -  
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The middle class there is smugglers; they live in mansions in Langa 
Township. So do I call them role models? I'm more educated than them 
but they're richer than me. That's why I'm saying [I’m] not the middle 
class, when I compare myself to the people who are richer than me - EL 
FG. 
It's not always applicable to everybody because that thing is sort of a 
dynamic thing. … I may be employed by that guy from the municipality 
there and then I get some few things overnight without being educated 
and then I have money. Would you classify me [middle class] if I have 
money? - EL FG.  
Class is also defined by having an education; to me it’s not just about 
money. I was born and brought up in England, and for someone to 
consider themselves middle class, they will have a certain level of school 
and gone to university, and be earning an extremely good - CT FG. 
The above suggests discontinuity with Krige’s (2012) argument that being 
middle class under apartheid meant knowledge of where individuals worked and 
derived income, because in the contemporary setting, an income can be derived 
from ‘dodgy’ operations and enable middle class location. Therefore in post-
liberation South Africa, being middle class is no longer synonymous with being 
educated and/or credentialed. Indeed, this echoes Weber’s (1948) stated tension 
between status and middle class position.  
4.5 Inter-racial relativity 
Kuper (1965) argued that the apartheid professional BMC did not enjoy the 
rewards of their class in the same that their white counterparts did, but did enjoy the 
status and income and ability to afford. Comparisons of Black and white middle class 
locations were given where “the middle class for the whites and the middle class for 
us is not the same;” thus being Black middle class could mean being “above the 
poverty line,” which did not apply for the white middle class. These assertions are 
consistent with the data presented by StatsSA (2009) and Phadi & Ceruti’s (2011) 
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findings. A white middle class individual was likened to a rich person of upper or 
higher class location in the Black community, while “the lower class in the white 
community might pass for middle class in the Black community.” Discussants 
explained that even in the case of the “same level of education and income” there was 
qualitative difference in middle class lifestyles between whites and Blacks, and this 
derived from white people having: - 
More and less to do, they have had the money for a long time. We now 
earn this money, but we can’t yet spend it for ourselves. We have to help 
others that are still very poor. What we have has to be shared amongst 
many, where there is nothing else - EL FG. 
Tempered by the low-level increases in income against high inflation rates, the 
financial crisis and other dynamics, other discussants explained that the qualitative 
lifestyle distance between the white and Black middle class was being narrowed, 
particularly among the younger generation: -  
If you compare those young white people and those young black people 
who came after apartheid, they are earning the same thing and they are 
struggling the same way - EL FG.  
I think it’s actually changing. There are actually now quite a lot of white 
people who are struggling, who have to help the other family members. 
It's no longer like in the past. You even find some white families who, 
you know, they have other dependants living with them, not because 
those kids don't want to move out but the reality is they can't afford to … 
- JHB FG. 
4.6 Intra community relativity  
It follows that political, social and economic concepts were utilised in delineating 
the middle class; and importantly, the intersection of race with class modified 
middle class belonging – particularly along the lines of community. The class 
position of the BMC must be understood within the context of Black class 
mobility. Meth (1983:173) previously argued that the apartheid BMC had 
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expanded from a very small base in a context of a large number of Black 
unemployed. This situation has remained in South Africa, where StatsSA (2014) 
illustrated a 40% level of unemployment for the Black-Africans in 2014. 
Therefore, while the BMC is rapidly expanding as Schlemmer (2005) described it, 
it does so against an increasing level of unemployed Black-Africans. In South 
Africa, unemployment increases faster than employment growth, and this has 
taken place across all educational levels – that is, those considered educated and 
skilled also suffer from unemployment. The contextual relativity thus places the 
BMC in an elevated position within communities: - 
Being a Black person, comparing myself with the community I'm coming 
from I'm elevated. I don’t want to lie. Because I'm educated, I've got a 
job; I've got an … asset, property…. But in my community if I compare 
myself … place myself in my community, when I look at myself I'm 
elevated in comparison to them – EL FG. 
In a slightly different way from the above, contextual relativity reinforces claims to 
middle class location. Therefore, relative affordability in a context of none or low 
affordability reinforces member’s self-placement in the middle class. Therefore, in the 
same way that Phadi & Ceruti (2011:102) found that middle class self-identification 
was predominantly based on affordability, for example, private health, South African 
or overseas higher education, that is the socially compared material reach – so too 
here: -  
I remember growing up in the township knowing one thing … only. … 
What I knew was mother could take us to a private doctor if she wanted 
to. I knew that I could go to university. I knew a whole it of things that 
my family could actually afford it, than our neighbours. And in a way, I 
thought I was middle class. You compare with what you know … apples 
with apples. I got a shock when I first went to Austria and a friend of 
mine said to the people that he knew ‘this is XA coming from a township 
in Khayelitsha, they’re very poor.’ I went like ‘I’m poor?! Seriously?! I 
didn’t know I was poor.’ Because to me, I could afford a lot of other 
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things than the people around me. I was in Austria for crying out loud! I 
was overseas, most people then, 1998, couldn’t afford to travel! CT FG.  
I grew up middle class. Since the day of my birth I have been middle class 
and even that is a relative experience. I went to university in the US but I 
was on scholarship and I was work study so I had to work. So next to my 
peers, the American girls whose parents were financing their education, 
who had cars, I looked poor. But this was my reality. It’s like well, where I 
come from I’m extremely privileged. My mother had a store, so holidays I 
will go and work in the shop. … All we can say to you is that we will 
educate you up until university. That’s all. That is our inheritance to you - 
JHB FG. 
4.6.1 Black tax 
Black Tax is about the redistributive position and role that the BMC plays. Class 
position is affected, shaped and mutated by race, deriving specifically from the above 
described African employment, unemployment and under-employment – or the 
general economic well-being of the African community; that “I cannot be middle 
class and leave my mom in poverty.” Thus, the BMC has “a greater responsibility or 
greater obligation towards community,” as such affordability is instrumentalised. 
These are “people are who supporting, not just themselves, but also they have their 
own kids to support and they also supporting their own parents and other extended 
family members;” and thus termed the “sandwich generation.”  
You know, sometimes they’ll be out of electricity in the middle of the 
month, and you get phone calls and you have to finance electricity in the 
Eastern Cape or you have to do Internet groceries and have them 
delivered ... - JHB FG. 
Progress for me defines all of us moving forward so I think that's a 
unique condition of the Black middle class that we never really talk 
about, like our dependants … I have to figure out, okay, this goes to A, B, 
C, D, E before I even touch my own things. So it's also those realities 
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where you talk about being Black middle class it's like, it's a unique set of 
circumstances that is really defined in a large part by our Blackness, 
culturally how it is we operate in the world where families are 
concerned, where extended families are concerned - JHB FG. 
I don’t have kids. I have my own expenses. My expenses don’t go to 
other things. … I see other people who are middle class and all the other 
pieces of money where they have to go. For me, it’s about also 
disposable income and what happens to my income. So there might be 
someone else who earns the same amount of money, but they’ve got a 
family - CT FG. 
It has been argued that the size and income of the middle class is important for 
democratic transition and consolidation. The South African context of Black tax is 
an important explanatory variable. I argue that the combination of size, income 
and Black tax could assist the BMC to consolidate democracy, it holds an 
influential position of educating and financially supporting working class or 
unemployed people, they can influence decision making (Schulz-Herzenberg, 
2014).  
4.7 Middle class & debt 
Affordability is closely linked to the consumption of debt. In a context of higher 
levels of community and family responsibilities and obligations, the debt 
consumption among the BMC is marked. Consumption thereof ranges from the 
need to afford better education, homes or expensive cars.  
It’s much better to finance education. I mean when we support these 
other people, if I may say, it’s not so much that we support hobbies. 
You’re mostly supporting school, you’re supporting that – GP FG.  
One discussant stated that the so-called BMC “full” of credit cards and personal 
loans that they utilised to differentiate themselves illustrating how debt was being 
instrumentalised for middle class location. Another stated that the so-called Black 
diamond generation was not “drowning” but “comatose in debt” because it had 
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bitten “more than we chew.” Interestingly, one specialist surgeon stated that “once 
you don’t need the credit you can move away from [being middle class].” 
Marxist thinking suggested the pauperisation of the middle class, wherein it would 
collapse into the proletariat; therefore, the increased financialisation of the BMC, 
alongside the entire economy for that matter, correlated with its 
instrumentalisation of debt, is possibly the combination of factors that 
proletarianise the BMC. Apart from that, discussants stated that capitalist debt 
was breaking the obligations or responsibility that BMC members typically have 
for their families and communities.  
The problem of capitalism is that the middle class is always the few and 
you will find that it will always be like. …(Its) A white man who puts up 
the yardstick there. So we always rush to that one and he moves a little 
bit so that there can be another rush and then you always move a little 
bit … and in order to reach that position we have got to loan some 
money and then we are kept in debt to an extent... We said that you 
have to have a change so that you can be able to improve somebody 
else’s condition. And then that movement of, which is done by capitalism 
deliberately, that short movement is always creating you not to have an 
extra amount of money to improve somebody else’s condition. Then we 
become selfish and then we become entrenched in those new values 
without any communal thing - EL FG. 
If anyone can change society it should be the middle class but we’re so 
busy trying to make money, trying to become the professionals. So we 
don’t have time. So the role that middle class should play is not really 
being played. The elites would change society, but why should they? 
They’ve got not reason either than philanthropy … cause for them South 
Africa works – Lawyer, JHB. 
Unfortunately, as Krige (2012:23) explained it: corporate South Africa rarely 
reinvests in Black township communities, therefore does not carry the burden of 
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responsibility and obligation to the communities it encumbers and draws profit 
from.  
… I was once a victim of my own doing that you get this on credit, and 
then you say, ‘ja, but I'll pay you.’ I had just moved out of home. I have 
an excuse, nè? Ja. And it was a bed, it was a need, nè, and a fridge. Of 
course I could buy it on cash … but I didn't. I paid – GP FG. 
I’ll just put it on credit card. We don't have those and you cannot be 
middle class if you have no credit cards - EL FG. 
… They ticked all the boxes, but I would not classify them as middle class. 
They are so highly geared, they’re so much in debt that they actually 
have very little discretionary income. And what has now happened is 
because we live, as human beings we tend to be aspirational - CT FG. 
Furthermore, debt consumption is also related to aspiration. This aspiration is 
commercialised by corporate South Africa – wherein various debt related products 
are, sometimes recklessly so, extended to the BMC. Income allows a person to be 
middle class, but debt strips away affordability and therefore middle class status. 
Credit access was a defining marker in being middle class. 
4.8 Conclusion  
For the discussants herein race remained a stronger identity marker than class, 
meaning that BMC members saw themselves first as Black and treated class identity 
and belonging as variable or given to change. A working class identity was also 
stronger than a middle class identity. The responsibility for family members and 
communities disciplines middle class positionality, making it tenuous and precarious. 
This responsibility is also where the social significance of the BMC is derived, as well 
as it makes them influential members of families, networks and communities. This is 
where the potential of the BMC to shape the Black community’s political ideas and 
attitudes resides. The precarity was exacerbated by the fact that middle class position 
was identified and attained through a job, which resulted in credit and affordability, 
but was mutable.   
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CHAPTER FIVE  
Political attitudes and activities of the professional Black 
middle class 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws heavily on the interviews conducted with higher professionals 
to map their political attitudes and activism, in order to offer a perspective on the 
social and political significance of the Black middle class. Furthermore, data from 
the focus groups is interwoven into this analysis. It begins by outlining the 
experiences of Black higher professionals, followed by discussion of the 
conditions under which the BMC sustains, halts or fractures its support for the 
ANC. 
Various scholars supposed that the materially supported BMC would be 
politically co-opted to support apartheid (Southall, 1980; Saul & Gelb 1981; 
Sarakinsky, 1986; Hudson & Sarakinsky, 1986; Jozana, 1989). This supposition 
was geared on the analysis that class mobility and the concomitant aspiration to 
consolidate that class position would disrupt and replace the Black racial alliance 
that stood against apartheid. Conversely, others argued that despite the sprinkling 
of material support to ‘apartheid’s chosen few’ (Lebelo, 1990), the dominant 
organising principle for the BMC was race; as such support for and links with the 
African masses would be sustained.  
In democratic South Africa, the expansion of the BMC has caused the 
resurfacing of this argument. Again, framed against the state as the creator and 
expander of the BMC, this argument is about whether the new BMC will be 
politically acquiescent and continue to support its supposed creator: the ANC; or 
if the support for the ANC will be severed and the BMC will move along to 
support other political parties and thus strengthening South Africa’s democracy; 
by disrupting the electoral hegemony of the ANC, leading to democratic 
pluralism. The major concern of both arguments is whether race remains the 
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dominant organising principle of the Black middle class, or if class has come to 
supersede race, and thus alter the traditional political support patterns. 
5.2 Normative & ideological systems of Black professional exclusion 
As with Evetts’ (2003) argument, the growth of professions, 
professionalisation and professionalism has had a positive impact in South Africa. 
Since 1994, there have been significant rates of entry into the professions by 
Black people, bolstered first by the Black Advancement (BA) programme of the 
1970s. Consequential to the post-1994 employment equity programme and the 
increased attainment of professional qualifications by Africans, there are now 
much higher levels of Black professionals in the public and private spheres, 
thereby increasing African’s class mobility.  
As Evetts explained, organisations, professionals and managers have defined 
and applied professionalism as a positive normative occupational value or as a 
negative ideological system and mechanism of control. Within Nzimande’s (1991) 
research, personnel officers who came through the BA programme faced multiple 
levels of resistance from white co-workers, managers and corporates. In his 
research the normative value of professional competence functioned as a 
hegemonic belief system that was utilised to exclude African professionals within 
the white-dominated corporate spaces.  
Professionals working in the private and public sphere explained the personal 
and organisational meanings of professionalism. Within the public sphere, 
discussants identified normative values of professionalism such as the “ethics of 
the company or municipality,” wherein professionals should have “integrity, 
honesty, punctuality, dignity and the correct technical expertise.”  
Comparatively, the levels of professionalism are extremely high, or perceived 
to be higher and more established within the corporate sector. Black higher 
professionals explained that the corporate spaces into which they entered had 
existing definitions and rules of the corporate culture, into which they had to 
assimilate. They also complained that corporate rules and definitions were applied 
less to white professionals and functioned more to discipline Black professionals. 
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In line with Nzimande’s findings, a lawyer reported that Black food like “samp or 
pap” was not served as part of the partner meals. Additionally, this lawyer stated 
that the assimilation of a Black professional into a white-corporate space also 
meant changing her manner of dress, talk and walk in order “to be the work.” She 
also said that she felt more comfortable with Black than white clients as she 
“laughs more, [is] more confident, we hug not shake hands, more relaxed,” 
whereas with a white client the working relationship was “stiff, [and they’re] just 
here for the job only.” Though this was limited to this discussant, this may suggest 
that occupational interaction between white and Black higher professionals is 
racially constrained.  
5.2.1 Punctuality & competence: disciplining mechanism of Black 
professionals  
Many other Black higher professionals stated that “being on time” was a 
strong professional value in the corporate sector, and that this value was applied 
more rigidly to Blacks. But for many of them this professional value was used to 
devalue, discipline and/or exclude Black professionals. The following quote 
illustrates the interplay between punctuality as a professional value; the 
determination of Black professional success as determined by the existing 
organisational culture; racialised expectations and how managers supervise and/or 
manage professionals: -  
Being a professional means arriving on time. Doing what is directed within 
the timelines. There’s already a culture, the culture dictates how you would 
do. For example, if I come to a meeting 5-minutes late [and explain]: ‘ah 
sorry guys, that was my nanny.’ It isn’t the same as a white person saying it. 
First of all, I am not even expected to have a nanny. …. So, how professional 
we are, especially as Black people, is very relevant. It depends on the kind of 
boss I have - Economist, JHB. 
For a specialist surgeon, punctuality was used as a civilising mission by the 
cultural norms of corporates, again the expectation thereof was differentially applied 
to Black and white professionals: -  
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Professional in these spaces means being civilised. … You’re 5-minutes late, 
a white colleague comes 5-minutes late, there’s a difference. What they are 
saying is you’re not white - Specialist surgeon, JHB. 
The economist stated that the corporate culture expected Black professionals to 
know their place, if they “questioned or contradict what is being said – it is 
insubordination. Because in this level you are expected to know who is who in the 
zoo, you must understand levels [corporate hierarchy] and your place in them” 
(Cited by Ngoma, 2014:161). 
Generally, many Black professionals stated that corporates were untransformed in 
respect of the number of Black professionals therein. One Chartered Accountant (CA) 
explained that the fund management or financial services sector was “horribly not 
transformed, because only 4% of the assets sit with Black people [companies].” This 
CA explained that the “financial services sector is run by white people” and therefore 
this made it “a white environment … not a Black environment.” In such spaces Black 
professionals had to contend against the “myths” that “Black people will not excel in 
[that] environment.” This he reasoned, was because, historically “Black people have 
always been seen as miners, rock-drill operators, teachers, policeman, soldiers.” 
Given this history, Black professionals in white-dominated corporates: - 
Get to a point where you need to prove you are capable of doing that [excel 
as a professional]. And that is where the problem comes. Because before 
anybody gives you a chance and before anybody believes that you can do 
something they want you to prove yourself - When the same laws do not 
apply to your other compatriots, those of a lighter shade (sic) - CA 3, JHB. 
The above was also reiterated by many other professionals. For example, a lawyer 
had a similar experience, wherein she explained that white professionals across the 
corporate hierarchy assumed and treated Black professionals as “incompetent,” who 
had to prove themselves before being taken “seriously” by their white counterparts. 
Importantly, she also observed that Black trainee lawyers, who because of EE, are 
able to get into blue-chip corporate law firms with an average pass of 60% in their 
law degrees, compared to the 70% and above requirement that is typically upheld for 
white trainees, tend to come into corporates “with entitlement attitude[s] and tend to 
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reinforce [the] idea that Blacks aren’t corporate material, and only the exception can 
make it.” This forms an unintended consequence of employment equity.  
Black professionals work from a place of being competent… you have to 
wow them [white professionals]. And they’re like ‘oh you’re quite smart.’ … 
It’s only a Black person where comment is made about ‘being intelligent, or 
competent.’ I have never heard that comment being said about a white 
person. First have to wow them and then they take you seriously - Lawyer, 
JHB. 
For these Black higher professionals, competence, a professional value and 
requirement was used trivially applied and functioned as a mechanism of edging out 
Black professionals from corporate spaces: - 
We’re still talking about that racism in the corporate world or in the working 
space. …I think people have got no idea how much Black talent gets 
suppressed every week. It's in the form of you first don't have an education; 
then you have the education; then you don't have the experience; and 
then… You get the experience and you're getting there and then it's almost 
like if … you didn't put your comma. There's now an exposure of how you 
didn't put your ‘dot’ and how you didn't cross your ‘t’ and it's almost as if 
there is a concerted effort to push Black people out of the workplace 
because you don't necessarily push them out by firing them or what but you 
just make the space unliveable - FG JHB. 
The above statements illustrate strong continuities in the perceived exclusion of 
Black professionals in white-dominated corporate spaces. This is because, in a similar 
fashion, Nzimande (1991) and Modisha (2006) found that technical knowledge or 
competence was used against in-coming Black professionals in the BA and EE 
discourses to prove that Black professionals did not belong in previously white-only 
corporate spaces. In Nzimande’s (1991:243) research, Mike Alfred, a personnel 
consultant is quoted from the Daily News (24/2/1987) as stating “we take racism for 
granted, it’s a matter of extreme naturalness to us whites. Over the years we have 
developed a highly sophisticated set of rationalisations to prevent Blacks from 
‘climbing’ the ladder…” Post-liberation, a Black manager in Modisha’s (2006:91) 
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research complained of a “… tendency for companies to divide positions to be 
occupied by Black people and people believe that Black people cannot perform like 
white people.”  
An interesting observation about the racialization of professionals and 
professionalism was made by the specialist surgeon about the general silence from 
white professionals and organisations on Wouter Basson’s attempt to practice 
medicine again: -  
Take Wouter Basson for instance. When his story is reported, there’s no 
emphasis on the fact that what he did at Cape Coast and he’s had no 
remorse for it, should that person be allowed to be a medical doctor in 
South Africa today?! Outside of the HPCSA there’s very few public 
institutions that are expressing this question. … Your white colleagues don’t 
see anything wrong with Wouter Basson wanting to carry on as normal. 
Which means they’ve normalised the wrong thing - Specialist Surgeon, JHB. 
5.2.2 Corporate political neutrality, suppression & discipline  
Black professionals in the corporate sector explained that the companies that they 
worked for were politically “neutral;” “apolitical” and lacked a particular political 
“identity.” For example, the lawyer stated, “our firm tries very hard to be apolitical. 
So ANC gives an instruction, we can say ‘no.’ In these politically neutral spaces, the 
“ability to generate profit” is a primary focus.  
Political discussions take place within the organisations, where “people do not 
come out and voice their opinion in public” and “depending who it is, we can have a 
political conversation.” This may take place in a clandestine manner or more 
specifically “it would probably happen in rooms.” For the lawyer, her seniority as a 
partner in the firm enabled her to express her opinions openly but still with a select 
audience: - 
My friends and I were discussing EFF and ANC and DA. Not that I’m an EFF 
member, I am not. But I do understand where they’re coming from. So 
when you share these views, they listen to you coz you’re friends. They 
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won’t listen to Malema’s views, and neither will I but I know where they’re 
coming from. In that way they become more tolerant. In conversation and 
sharing views, you become more tolerant. [For me] the DA and for them the 
ANC or EFF… Not that it will change their view, but at least you create more 
tolerance amongst each other – Lawyer, JHB. 
The lawyer explained that her principles were that she is “pro-Black” instead of 
direct support the ANC, whereas the second interviewed IT executive stated that he 
was assertive and principled and, while a strong supporter of the ANC would not 
suggest “that we need do this work in the ANC way.” Most importantly, where 
political conversations take place, Black higher professionals are measured in their 
interaction because: - 
People with their political ideas that are different to yours are with you 
every day, and those people could have some level of determination on 
your career. Which then means that, sometimes one has to navigate 
through this in a careful manner. Careful manner in the sense that your 
political ideals are not the most important thing here - CA 3, JHB. 
The apolitical corporate culture meant that Black professionals that support the 
ANC did so clandestinely: - 
If you were pro-Jacob Zuma in the workplace it would destroy your career, 
especially in corporate South Africa … If you try starting to sit with a bunch 
of colleagues from different racial groups, and you say ‘no, but Jacob Zuma 
is doing a good job.’ The question isn’t ‘why do you say that?’ The question 
is ‘how can you say that?!’ Like, ‘we thought you were smart, and then you 
say something so strange.’ But if you thought I was smart, then you would 
want to know why I’m saying Jacob Zuma is doing a good job. Because, did I 
become stupid? Specialist Surgeon, JHB. 
It would be a negative to say I am a member of the ANC. It would suggest 
that you are political. And being political has never been a good thing in all 
the corporates that I have worked in [top South African banks]. … I have a 
colleague who is ANC but he hides it. And he is actually quite active, he is a 
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branch leader. We talk about politics all the time, but it isn’t something that 
is well known in the organisation… - Economist, JHB. 
5.3 Sustained support for the ANC 
5.3.1 Employment Equity & business opportunities 
This research confirms the pervasive argument that the ANC’s post-1994 
redistributive policies, which represent the removal of racialised barriers to the 
economy and the imposition positive policies have sustained BMC political support 
for the party (Mattes, 2014; Modisha, 2006; Rivero, du Toit & Kotze 2003; Southall, 
2004; Schlemmer, 2005; Seekings, 2010; Visagie, 2011; Alexander, Ceruti, Motseke, 
Phadi & Wale, 2013 and UCT 2005, 2014; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009b). This is 
because many of the discussants ascribed class mobility and income accruing to Black 
people to EE and BEE. In particular, the transformation of higher education was also 
identified as significant for class mobility.  
However, sustained political support for the ANC cannot solely be ascribed to the 
ANC’s redistributive policies. Instead, sustained BMC support for the ANC is 
reinforced by the perpetual penurious socio-economic conditions and circumstances 
that the BMC exists within, specifically the high rates of Black unemployment and 
middle class precarity. Thus, as discussed in Chapter 5, Black tax and high levels of 
consumerism - including debt consumption have, firstly, created high levels of 
precarity in middle class position and secondly, increased the need to consolidate 
middle class position. Aspirationally, the BMC’s value of education represents its 
work towards entrenching its middle class position across generations.  
Thus, many BMC professionals, managers and entrepreneurs, first recognized the 
material improvement in their lives; second aspired to consolidate and entrench their 
middle class position; and thirdly aspired to move up and beyond it. This reinforces 
Schlemmer’s (2005) argument that the BMC’s ANC support was pragmatic, solid and 
durable. The ANC government, more so than South African corporates that are 
dominantly white owned, was seen as “a huge source of income and business” and 
educational opportunities for Black professionals and entrepreneurs, and thus 
associated strongly with Black class mobility. As such, the BMC-ANC support is 
instrumentalised or pragmatised and sustained for this reason. This instrumentalised 
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support for the ANC takes place even in the context of perceived poor or weak party 
performance, as it functions to strengthen class position and perpetuate class mobility: 
- 
But if there was a white and qualified person next to you, in the olden days, 
the white and qualified person would get preference because they are 
white, but today that has been factored out. Without the ANC, I can 
honestly say that I don’t know that I would be here - CA 3, JHB. 
I’m voting for the ANC. … I am a beneficiary of ANC policy. This is a view one 
can hold whether you work in corporate South Africa, or as an entrepreneur 
– Engineering Consultant, JHB (cited by Ngoma, 2014:160). 
I voted for business [ANC], it was more business related. I was like ‘between 
the two parties, really?’ It boils down to race in this country. One party [DA] 
is still going to see me as Black, another party [ANC] is going to say ‘let’s 
support you in policy. It’s not really implemented that way, but at least the 
thought is there – CT FG (cited by Ngoma, 2014:163). 
5.3.1.1 Experienced racism & exclusion: parties & corporates 
Furthermore, in the context of persistent white control of the economy (Southall, 
2004/2014), sustained political support for the ANC draws from comparative analysis 
against white parties and white-owned or dominated corporates and businesses. The 
sustained support for the ANC entailed a direct rejection of the DA because the latter 
is perceived to have economically excluded BMC individuals and Black people 
collectively. Black professionals and entrepreneurs viewed the DA as unsupportive of 
their class mobility, consolidation and entrenchment. As one economist explained “I 
would vote for the DA if they were clearer on their transformation stance, 
unfortunately they are not (Ngoma, 2014:162). Thus, professionals and entrepreneurs 
felt that support for the DA risked their participation and competitiveness in the 
economy and labour market and thus risked their middle class position, ibid. The 
history of the ANC as a successful liberation party, contrasted with the historical 
performance of the National Party, now the DA, and the DA’s weak performance at 
Black socio-economic inclusion reinforced the support for the ANC: - 
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… Especially in the last elections, my vote was emotional because I wasn’t 
choosing the better devil between the two; there was only one to choose 
from. And even if you don’t really want to because… you want to have a 
learned choice, however there’s a past. Past history makes me look at one 
party [DA] and say – ‘you’ll never have my vote. Because … you don’t have 
any interest in me as a black person…’ - CT FG. 
Considering where we come from, I don’t think even with my combination 
of skills …the white Nationalist government would have plucked me from 
wherever I am and encouraged me to actually participate, and to create an 
enabling environment for me to participate in the mainstream economy – 
Engineering Consultant, JHB (cited by Ngoma, 2014:160). 
A lack of support and racial exclusion from corporates was also reported: -  
When we first started our company we could not get a job in the private 
sector, for love or money. If the government had not been there we would 
just have folded in the first six months, quite honestly. … BEE existed but it 
wasn't even a consideration [for corporates]. It was like ‘no, no, we've got 
our own companies.’1… One of the very jobs actually that we got in the 
private sector was with a motor manufacturer and it was a Black man who 
consciously said ‘I want to give you guys a chance because all our suppliers 
are white and it's a problem.’ … It was a conscious decision to say we need 
to diversify this space - JHB FG. 
There are still challenges in the mainstream economy that are structural, 
that manifest themselves in racial inequality. Whether … I am dealing with 
the banks, I cannot help but think that some of the positions I find myself 
with the banks is also largely because I am Black - Engineering Consultant, 
JHB (cited by Ngoma, 2014:160). 
The issue of land-ownership was controversial: - 
                                                     
1
 Meaning that white corporates explained that they already had their suppliers.  
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My feelings are that white society is clinging onto its privilege, not even 
privilege, it’s clinging onto the proceeds of crime and the situation is 
unbearable. And if they don’t come to the party soon we will find a situation 
which we thought we had avoided 20 years ago. Civil war. No, we can’t sit 
like this, I mean 5% of the land [Black-owned] and people are saying ‘but ja, 
ja but my grandfather bought the farm and he worked to build it up.’ Fuck 
you, your grandfather was given that farm dirt cheap, and it was actually 
taken from my grandfather. So fuck you! - Specialist Surgeon, JHB.  
When I read their policies, they are on point, even when we talk about land 
… I think for me that will be the time when we access land from a heritage 
point of view. I could have broken into upper class had my mother had land. 
So there’s a lot of things that I think the ANC can do for me – but I’m not 
there to influence it - CT FG.  
5.3.2 BMC’s historical & ideational ties to ANC 
The continued racialised exclusion of Black people from economic opportunities; 
the BMC’s historical and ideational ties to the ANC; and the absence of a better 
political party to rival the ANC within the South Africa’s political spectrum worked 
to sustain BMC political support for the ANC. This supposed deficiency in the 
electoral marker (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009b) lack of a “better political party” to the 
ANC sustained its support, even in the case where BMC individuals recognised the 
party’s deficiencies, because the ANC represented a: - 
Progressive movement, it’s the best option we have at the moment. … I vote 
all the time. They are the best option, it’s screwed up now but… - Research 
executive, JHB. 
This is why a specialist surgeon had sustained his support for the ANC, as he felt 
that the progressive movement was under attack. He explained that he had returned to 
support the ANC because the DA and South African media had criminalised the 
ANC, second that his support was “in solidarity with the rest of the Black 
population,” and third because there was a need to rebuild and strengthen the ANC, 
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particularly in response to the growing strength of the DA. The following extended 
quote outlines his position: - 
I think we must stick with the stronger group and fix that one, rather than 
forming 19 splinter groups. Yes I think it is important that we have strength 
in numbers. … My conviction of this is strengthened by the fact that, if you 
look at the South African landscape, the major break away parties that we 
have seen have all happened on the Black side. On the white side you have 
a consolidation, where the DA still calls itself the DA but it absorbed the NP. 
So it can’t still be calling itself the DA. But instead on the Black side, you’re 
finding there’s splinter groups, COPE, Agang, EFF, New National Party or 
New Inkatha or whatever. There’s always new breakaway movements. And 
the net effect is the same as that which was desired by the National Party 
when they promoted tribalism, it’s a division and conquer [sic]. So I will stay 
in the ANC - Specialist Surgeon, JHB. 
Schulz-Herzenberg’s (2009b) asserted that cognitively mobilised voters would 
move their support based on evaluations of incumbent performance. This differs from 
the findings presented here. For example, discussants in the CT FG were dissatisfied 
with the performance of the ANC, where one explained that while the ANC no longer 
represented what she currently stood for, she continued to vote for the party because 
of her “emotional ties” to it. Retained support is explained by emotional and historical 
ties to the ANC, as echoed by another discussant in the same group: -  
I think the middle class expects a different service from the government and 
we’re not getting it… I think there’s a certain level of expectations that are 
not being met and had we not had the recent memory of history in South 
Africa, there’s lots of people that could have chosen differently. Then, but I 
think there’s history that arrests us … me. I’m trying to choose something 
different, I end up with the same party. … I was stuck at the president’s 
personality,2 that history overrode it – CT FG.  
                                                     
2
 She did not like the ANC party president Zuma’s personality. 
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On the other hand a CA that strongly supported the ANC because he “did not 
suffer from amnesia” and had made it as a successful professional because of the 
ANC and recognised that the ANC was not perfect and had its shortcomings, but he 
rationalised that many other “political organisations” also had shortcomings. He 
believed that professionals had to overcome their dislike of particular leaders in the 
ANC and participate within the party in order to improve its performance. In fact, 
most fascinatingly he believed that the increased levels of education that the BMC 
had attained caused it to divorce itself from the ANC as it was led by less educated 
individuals: - 
Yet the very same middle class have been enabled by the very same ANC. 
They think that they know better. Because I have an education, and I’m a 
CA, and Jacob Zuma doesn’t have an education and he’s not a CA. And 
Hlaudi Motsoeneng doesn’t have an education and he’s not a CA, … I think 
certain positions should be occupied by certain people with certain 
qualifications. Which is not necessarily the case. Because some people go to 
… the academic university, other people go to the university of life and 
people go to the university of work experience – CA 3, JHB. 
The ANC represented “the best option,” for the deracialisation and development 
of Black society, which functioned to sustain BMC support. First, the ideational 
coherence and complementarity between the BMC and ANC maintained political 
support, and was itself also instrumentalised. Second, and in contrast to Schlemmer, 
Schulz-Herzenberg, and Mattes these findings illustrate that BMC support for the 
ANC is based on policy choice and assessment, because too often this literature 
implicitly suggests that support for the ANC is not based on the BMC’s rational 
assessment of the ANC’s policies: -  
My parents raised us to believe in Black pride, but not necessarily a specific 
political movement. My dad was an ANC supporter… It’s just that in South 
Africa that’s racialised. … Our parents raised us to be good human beings. 
And growing up the only party that espoused those views was the ANC. And 
even today I am not convinced that there’s a different party that espouses 
the same things - Specialist Surgeon, JHB. 
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The above quotation echoes Schulz-Herzenberg’s (2014) exposition that 
homogenous interpersonal networks are significant in shaping political attitudes and 
vote choice finds cogency in the findings presented here. Discussants recognised that 
the social networks influenced voting behaviour and attitudes towards a political party 
so that “as long as that political party is relevant in your house … that is passed 
down.” A discussion about the voting patterns of 18 year olds, called ‘born-frees,’ 
ensued in the Cape Town focus group. In this discussion, it was rationalised that born-
frees voted for the ANC and would continue to do so “until people are actually born-
free” and until their parents break their ties to the ANC. In this focus group, BMC-
ANC support was heightened because “you get marginalised in the Western Cape 
because you’re Black.” So that even in the case where families believed in the 
freeness and equality between Black and white of South Africans “the minute they 
walk out of your house, the world is gonna tell them ‘No! no, no, no!” Therefore, the 
perpetuation of a racialised society in which “the struggle is not over|” sustained and 
reinforced BMC-ANC support. 
… By and large I think the ANC has done a lot to improve the lives of the 
Black people. ANC must continue to work for the poorer population, and for 
all of us, to address the vestiges of unequal development - Specialist 
Surgeon, JHB. 
I am partisan towards poor people that they should get a better deal, 
partisan that working people should get better salaries… …Regardless of 
who the party might be, if they also support those ideas, then they’ll get my 
support. The ANC of course, broadly speaking. Of the parties that are there, 
the ANC … comes close to the ideas that I espouse, and it is the one political 
party that seeks to implement some of the things that I want implemented - 
Research executive, JHB. 
5.4 Active ANC party participation 
Many Black higher professionals, whether they supported the ANC or not, were 
not active in party politics. The main reason for this was the perceived lack of 
tolerance for “dissent” or opposing views within ANC branches. The lawyer 
explained that she had wanted to participate in branch-politics as opposed to 
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complaining about the party on the side-lines, however, she had been dissuaded by the 
reported lack of tolerance from branches located in suburbia: -  
We had a debate, where we’re Black middle class keep … complaining. So 
what’s the point of being an armchair critic? That’s not good. Just get out 
there and actually just be involved. How? Get into the branch structures. My 
brother went. He says you can’t even get a word in, because the minute you 
dissent you’re called ‘impimpi’ [spy] or whatever. And this is in Sandton. So 
he says ‘it’s fine. I’m over it.’ I almost did [join a branch] but it was the time 
where you were hearing a lot of stuff about the branches not being tolerant 
of different, diverging views - Lawyer, JHB. 
The above statement was supported by the opinion of the specialist surgeon, who 
felt that participating openly in the ANC would rescind his ability to speak 
freely:-  
I think if I was a card carrying member of the ANC I would not be allowed to 
say some of the things I say as freely, they might be seen as things that you 
shouldn’t say. And I think just as a Black educated South African, I am freer 
to say more things. If I was, for example in a government employ, I wouldn’t 
be able to have necessarily criticised Zwelithini for saying that the foreigners 
must go, and if I was in corporate I wouldn’t have been able to criticise Zille 
for saying the foreigners must go, but she was referring to us…. - Specialist 
Surgeon, JHB. 
Our failure as professionals is that we don't engage the organisation [ANC] 
that we love …. I understand that maybe the space is not provided for us to 
engage and so on but I think it's up to us so that how do we then begin to 
engage and build this organisation… Hence I’m saying that we don't care … - 
EL FG. 
Instead, for the lawyer it was better for her to spend her time working and 
ensuring that she continued to rise up the corporate ladder and becoming entrenched 
in the middle class or elite, rather than arguing with “buffoons” and joining “party 
that’s already gone wrong.” The research executive explained that while he supported 
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the ANC, and knew many ANC people and attended ANC events, he was “beyond 
party politics,” because of his public intellectual role and because “party politics … 
can be quite unbecoming, can be quite nasty. It has its own people….” One 
participant in the CT focus group also thought it important to join and participate in 
ANC branch politics in order to choose a leader and influence policies. However she 
was dissuaded by the idea that to be taken seriously and make a meaningful 
contribution at branch level meant that she had to have political capital, in that her 
family had to have a strong struggle history: - 
So until I, as a middle class person can go to branch and influence policy, go 
to Mangaung or whatever it is, until I can do that and choose a leader that 
can represent me, then I have no right to complain … My perception of the 
ANC is that it probably wouldn’t entertain me, why: because I don’t have 
the credential, I could bring in my father’s credentials but I don’t know if he 
is remembered because he died a long time ago – CT FG. 
To which another discussant responded: - 
It’s funny- the way that you sort of express that – it’s almost as though 
there’s a second citizenship and that second citizenship is South African. The 
first citizenship is ANC citizenship. And so, you almost feel like you are in an 
ANC democracy, but that’s not that important; what’s more important is 
your being able to influence ANC policy, ANC decisions, ANC whatever. In 
my view, I’m a constitutionalist – I find that a little surprising – Cape Town 
FG participant. 
IT executives interviewed herein were both active participants at the branch level. 
For one, the main reason was to ensure that he participated in the decision-making 
processes of the ANC. For him, this was as a result of the voting-turn results at the 
ANC Polokwane conference where then President Thabo Mbeki lost his presidential 
campaign for the ANC.  
I realised that you can’t just support the ANC, one must define what it is 
that I’m supporting within the ANC. I think it was pretty much what 
happened [at] Polokwane. I actually decided to start participating, because 
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if I don’t participate then there are people will make that decision for me, 
and I have to be part of that decision making process - IT Executive 2, JHB. 
5.5 BMC rejection of DA & Agang SA 
As illustrated in the preceding sections, discussants explained the need to 
“have a learned choice” and break their support for the ANC, but were bound by 
historical and ideational ties to the party. In addition to this, many of their 
assessments of other parties led to the conclusion that despite the ANC’s failures, 
South Africa lacked a political replacement for the ANC. Mattes (2014) suggested 
that the BMC was more likely to support the DA, this does not appear to be the 
case here. Apart from its DA’s low appetite for Black economic empowerment 
and the deracialisation of the economy, BMC individuals had multiple other 
problems with the party and would not and had not supported it. For example, the 
“DA’s use of Black people” like Mamphela Ramphele, Lindiwe Mazibuko and 
Mmusi Maimane
3
 explains the BMC’s perception that the DA was using Black 
faces to attract Black voters. This caused the BMC’s distrust of the party.  
Mmusi Maimane - the question as to whether he’s got the necessary 
experience to be president of even the DA is never put forward. The guy has 
just come into the party like 3 or 4 years and now he’s going to be their 
leader! The same party was willing to put Mamphele Ramphela as 
president, someone they’d never discussed politics with ever! So just 
because she was seen to be toeing their line, she was just not an option, she 
was the ideal option. So the value of things is ascribed by where they come 
from [being Black] and not the content of what they are saying - Specialist 
surgeon. 
In addition, the lawyer explained that the election of an inexperienced Maimane 
undermined affirmative action, as when he failed it would serve as proof that Black 
people were incapable of leadership: - 
                                                     
3
 Mazibuko serves as parliamentary leader of the DA from 27 October 2011 to 11 May 2014, while 
party leader Helen Zille served as Premier of the WC. Maimane succeeded Mazibuko as parliamentary 
leader in 2014 and subsequently replaced Zille as leader of the party after her resignation from that 
position.  
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The DA is not an option, for many reasons, one is that they are anti-ANC and 
nothing else. … Lindiwe and Mmusi, I am sure they’re intelligent, I am sure 
they are brilliant. If he becomes leader of Gauteng… it’s like making me a 
CEO of some company, I am sure I am smart, but I am not there yet, those 
positions come with experience and time and wisdom… You can’t just put 
somebody who is Black and perch them … putting Mmusi on a pedestal … 
when he fails. … It undermines affirmative action, it undermines Black 
people… You’re putting someone and ‘look, look, look, our poster boy’ and 
when he fails it’s like all Blacks are unable. That’s my issue with the DA. I 
don’t agree with their policies. … I don’t blame anyone who says let me 
consider the DA, I just don’t know how if you’re Black you can do that. So 
there is no choice in South Africa right now - Lawyer, JHB.  
Mamphela Ramphele, BMC individuals had perceived leader of Agang South 
Africa as “such an opportunity.” However, the inability to offer “anything different” 
and the failed merger between the DA and Agang caused the loss of integrity and 
belief in the leader. In the end, her failure to attend Parliament after Agang’s paltry 
performance at the polls made her seem like she had entered the political race to raise 
donor funding! 
If you look at someone like Mamphela Ramphele you can see that the 
money she has made since 1994 has gone to her head! She now thinks she’s 
above the rest of the Black population’s struggles and that’s why she can 
preach to them and then not go to Parliament. Yes, if she really believed 
what she was preaching in her campaign, she would have been in 
parliament trying to promote it. But she had no intention of going to 
parliament. In fact she probably just did it for the donor funding - Specialist 
surgeon, JHB. 
And unfortunately there isn’t another party – even Agang for that matter – 
to me it doesn’t come with policies … Actually EFF is something. I like the 
land part. I’m very passionate about land for Africans – CT FG. 
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Interestingly, one entrepreneur and supporter of the ANC, imagined that if within 
a democratic society, where a minority ruled over a majority group, which is if the 
DA had political rule, the party would feel compelled to perform better than the ANC 
for fear of Black majority anger. Therefore, “an uncomfortable white government – 
the DA – will make sure that they do things better. They don’t want the masses to be 
restless. The white government would work harder to quell any discontent that may 
arise from the Black masses.” 
5.6 Fractured support for the ANC 
Southall (2004; 2014) suggested that proximity to the government was likely to 
determine BMC political support. So, social distance from the ANC, like working the 
corporate sector may promote independence from the ANC, while government 
managers and executives may be aligned to the ANC. However, my findings illustrate 
that proximity to the state and the application of EE and BEE by the ANC works in 
different ways towards sustaining BMC support of the ANC.  
5.6.1 Proximity & the politicisation of occupational settings  
First, depending on the proximity of professionals to the ANC led government, as 
according to the findings of this study, this support is beginning to be frustrated and 
fractured because “there’s no political tolerance in South Africa. Corrective measures 
[in local government] are not taking place by politicians. That’s why there’s new 
formation of political parties.” In contrast to Southall’s (2014) essentialist declaration 
that the BMC that has “found itself in position of power, privilege and profit is not 
likely to bite the hand of the party-state that feeds it,” some higher professionals in 
government have “moved away from supporting the ANC to supporting EFF, while 
others were privately ambivalent towards the ANC, had no interest in another party, 
but were silent about this position,” (Ngoma, 2014: 167-168).  
There are two ways in which this works. First, the fracturing of ANC support by 
the BMC takes place from the vantage of a clash between professional autonomy and 
political influence and interference. Neo-Weberian analysis emphasises the 
importance of professions’ and professionals’ ability and extent of influence in 
bureaucratic and corporate settings. Therefore, in this research, higher professionals 
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operating in highly politicized state organisations that dilute professional power, 
autonomy, and control over work-tasks has led to the fracturing of their support for 
the ANC. This finding was particularly poignant in the interviews conducted with 
CAs employed in the local government sphere. While a lawyer working for a 
corporate firm stated that for the “first and second administrations [there] were good 
deployments,” CAs explained that the ANC’s deployment strategy had resulted in the 
politicization of otherwise technical areas, such as financial management and 
accounting in the local government sphere. Deployees were perceived as seeking to 
“gain things for themselves as they are deployed, they only want to benefit from the 
system.” One CA described the threat to technically governed area of financial 
management as: - 
Our governance structures are intact. We have financial and performance 
management controls that are intact. The inherent risk that we can’t always 
manage is temptation. People transgress the controls for personal gain - CA 
2, Durban. 
Another CA explained that the politicization of work took place through 
deployees’ lobbying of senior officials and the political elite for budgetary allocations 
and reallocations that stood outside of authorised annual performance plans. This 
finding reinforces the same findings that emerged out of Ndletyana et al’s (2013) 
study, wherein councillors imposed their political authority to divert local government 
resources. Therefore, the situation of a parasitic bureaucratic bourgeoisie is 
continuing and it suggests a back firing of the strategy to increase domestic patriotic 
investment, as per Southall’s (2005, 2014) argument. The social and political 
significance of the professional BMC is thus diluted and hindered by the actions of a 
parasitic bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and in fact signals increasing levels of internal 
conflict between different segments of the BMC. An implication of this is the 
possibility that, as the BMC increases in number, its political significance may be 
precipitated or erupted and be realised through this conflict. The imposition of 
political hierarchy also isolates and silences the professional BMC, to which they 
devise mechanisms of navigation and survival within the poor public service 
professional environment.  
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In the same way that Freidson (1988, 1994) explained it, the political lobbying 
and imposition of political power thus interfered with the control and autonomy over 
work that CAs have: - 
[Deployees lobby] inside and outside. They lobby senior officials, municipal 
managers, at the regional office of the ANC. By the time the idea comes to 
me, it is also ready sorted from those areas and I have to implement, sign 
off - CA 1, Durban. 
They [politicians] don’t mean what they say, they don’t lead by example. We 
need to change the way they do things. We have a good leadership [at] 
senior management and political leadership - CA 2, Durban.  
CAs distinguished between the political and accounting professional spheres 
where “accounting does not mix with politics” and established a tension between the 
two spheres. CAs use other measures to maintain autonomy and control over work 
tasks, where assertiveness and technical knowledge is used; in addition to being “a 
silent politician, but I speak my mind to counsellors. I don’t let them get away with 
anything. I am not a political but I follow them [politics]. I must understand what is 
political. I have never been a politician and I will never be.” CAs recognized the 
necessity to “understand the dynamics because you operate within the sphere of 
politics. Understanding them [the politics] is very important, otherwise you will be 
lost.” At the same time CAs sought to apply “professional standards rather than 
politics” to carry out work, therefore seeking to maintain the professional autonomy, 
monopoly and control over work tasks. Commenting on the state of Black 
professionals within the public sector, the lawyer stated: - 
I’m so sick of politics. I used to follow politics quite avidly... But, now, it’s like 
the ANC doesn’t care. Every week there’s something wrong is happening. 
The tax guy, the top professional at SARS. Every time at lunch, he was the 
topic of the day. Why is [it] that every week there’s a top Black professional 
falling? Almost like there’s some sort of conspiracy. It looked like it was 
kinda not normal, but they [white colleagues] were happy. And you find that 
people don’t respect Black professionals - Lawyer, JHB. 
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The politicized interference also diluted the high status and privileged conditions 
of work. Another CA recognized the authority of his professional body over his 
political principals, stating “[I’m a] member of SAICA, I ascribe to their accounting 
theory by affiliation. … Can’t serve two chiefs … we … didn’t study for politics.” 
This CA was explaining that work tasks should be controlled by the professional 
standards prescribed by the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(SAICA) regulatory framework. Therefore, the authority to regulate the standards and 
rules by the professional body was in tension with that of the organisation’s political 
principals’ and demands. Southall (2014:657) supposed that BMC “found” itself in 
positions of power, privilege and profit, and the sentiments from this CA contradict 
his arrogant stance. This finding further calls for segmentation in the analysis of the 
BMC.  
Thus, the political affiliations and demands, as in the “dirty” politics engendered 
animosity towards working with “dirty” politicians and politically charged 
organisations; it further diluted the interest in working for the government, as CAs 
thus aspired to work in corporate settings or starting their businesses. Therefore, while 
40% of the BMC works within the public sector (UCT, 2012), there are those seeking 
an exit and they are enabled by the high demand for their qualifications and skills 
(Macdonald, 1995); thus suggesting that the politicisation of the public sector depletes 
professionals therein. 
5.6.2 Poor ANC performance  
As with Schlemmer (2005) and Schulz-Herzenberg (2014), although this was not 
a dominant finding in this research, one discussant stated that he did not vote 
according to traditional ‘ANC’ values or emotional association to a party.  
Certainly having an education and some of these factors we spoke about, I 
think definitely has an influence. You are voting not based on emotion, not 
based on what the traditional values were. You are voting based on the 
issues, based on what policy says. For you to understand what the issues are 
and what policy says, you have to have a certain level of education, a certain 
level of understanding of issues around you - CT FG.  
76 
 
One lawyer explained that she would not vote for the ANC anymore, or EFF, 
because the two exploited lower class’ “primal needs” and illiteracy by giving them 
“food packs” for votes. She explicitly stated that the ANC does not “give a damn” for 
the middle class, as such the party ignored the needs of the BMC. The party’s 
dependence on the “lower class” vote enabled its success at elections. She explained 
that while the Black middle class may be dissatisfied with the performance of the 
ANC, this did not affect the party at the polls because of the lower numbers of the 
BMC. 
We’ve got one-man-one-vote in South Africa. The most number of votes is 
in the lower class, which is where the majority of our country is. … People 
who don’t understand, who aren’t literate. … And if you ask anybody in the 
middle class, for most of my friends – ANC has just messed up. So, how 
much do our votes really count? … They do but not like the lower class. … 
But are they [illiterate] equipped enough about how the country should be 
run? The ANC is going to come back because of the lower class vote. That’s 
why they don’t care what the middle class is saying, because really how 
much are we, we’re not that much. They don’t give a damn! So we don’t 
have a say when it comes to voting. So that’s what enables the ANC and EFF, 
to be able to go and give food packs to the people in the villages… and then 
tell them things that are impossible to achieve but they can’t discern. That is 
why you’re going to get ANC coming back and EFF getting strength, cause 
they‘re appealing to primal needs, and they’re ignoring those of the middle 
class because they can afford to - Lawyer, JHB. 
She explained that she would vote as this was important for her and her family, 
and that she would vote for UDM, not because it was good, but that “the others are 
bad really.” She maintained that she still wanted the ANC in power but wanted to 
hear “a different voice in parliament.” 
I will vote. ANC: not a chance. EFF: not a fucking chance. DA; not a fucking 
chance. For me right now, it’s just about getting a different voice into 
parliament. I want to ensure that the ANC doesn’t get the majority vote, 
they’ve gone haywire. At the same time, I want them to still be in power 
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because they’re the most valid choice that we have. … I do want the UDM to 
win, but I like hearing their voice and so I will put them there… – Lawyer, 
JHB. 
Therefore, in many ways, voting for the UDM was about giving the ANC “a 
wakeup call” as the party had become “complacent” and was busy defending its many 
scandals as opposed to serving South Africans. A discussant in the EL focus group 
stated that she was a staunch ANC member and served in its executive, but would not 
support it anymore, something she stated she was prepared to suffer for, because the 
ANC was no longer following the policies that it had previously fought for during the 
liberation struggle.  
In line with Schulz-Herzernberg’s (2009b) idea that voters withdrew rather than 
moved their support to another party, another discussant stated that she would not 
vote anymore, until “there’s somebody who comes and says I'm going to do this, then 
I can see that this person is doing this and this and a change to my life.” She 
complained that she was tired of paying tax while living in a suburb with potholes. 
She also admonished the silence of the Black middle class professionals on these 
issues: -  
There are many potholes in this area and the people are living in this area … 
they are heavily taxed and we don't complain. We’ve got this tendency, 
Black people don't complain. The whites in England, if they say petrol is 
going up by one pound they will moan and moan and they go and protest 
and it won't … up. Black people don't complain and we are suffering. We are 
supposed to complain - EL FG. 
And secondly, why we are so quiet is because you are scared these days if 
you are so vocal about your views because you are going to be marginalised 
and put aside. You won't get tenders anymore; you won’t get anything 
because you talk too much or you don't belong to a certain clique of people. 
That's why people are so quiet because they are scared of their future. If I 
keep quiet then I won't get this job or this tender so until people arise and 
speak out and say enough is enough – it will take us to arise and say it is 
enough and speak the truth - EL FG. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that Black higher professionals in the main, sustained their 
support for the ANC, specifically related to the need to strengthen the strides in the 
economy made possible by the party. ANC sustained its support because of continued 
and perceived racism and exclusion of the new Black middle class in the economy. 
Entrepreneurs and higher professionals operating in the corporate sector complain of 
the slow transformation in deracialising the workplace by the ANC. For them, 
professionalism is utilised not as a function of maintaining monopoly over work-
tasks, but as a racial disciplining measure, unlike the manner in which it is 
instrumentalised for crude accumulation in the public sector. Therefore, this illustrates 
continuities from Nzimande’s (1991) findings in apartheid South Africa and 
reinforces Modisha’s (2006) study argument of the racialised precarity African 
managers in the corporate sector. However, there were other BMC members that 
halted and fractured their support of the ANC. The first were professionals working in 
highly politicised state department and parastatals. Second were higher professionals, 
managers and entrepreneurs that were dissatisfied about the performance of the ANC.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
Discussion & Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
This study set out to determine the socio-political capacity of higher professionals, 
entrepreneurs and managers in the Black middle class. It examined how this BMC 
constructs its class and professional identities and how this shapes its political 
attitudes.   
6.2 BMC socio-political capacity 
Although the theoretical and measurement differences in middle class scholarship 
have resulted in varied assessments of the proportion of the BMC there’s broad 
consensus that more Black people have advanced into middle class occupations and 
professions. Similar to most of the arguments posed by various analysts, notably 
Shlemmer, 2005; Southall, 2005; Pottinger, 2008 and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009b, the 
BMC studied herein attributes its middle class ascension and location to employment, 
income, debt consumption and educational qualifications that have been enabled 
through the application of EE and BEE policies of the ANC-led government. 
The manner, mechanisms and explanatory contexts that BMC members ascribe or 
impose on their location and status elucidates the relationships between race, class 
and political attitudes. Historically, we understand that segments of the BMC during 
apartheid variedly supported the liberation movement or were materially co-opted and 
politically complacent. Post-liberation, the ANC consolidated BMC support, 
however, 20 years into democracy, this support is beginning to fragment. The reasons 
are multiple. Firstly, the findings herein illustrate that BMC support for the ANC is 
instrumental and sustained by its unconsolidated and precarious class position and 
identity, comprised of: a historical and current asset deficit; Black tax; debt and the 
perpetuated invisible colour bar. Fundamentally, the perpetuation of racial economic 
exclusion, particularly in the corporate sector reinforces BMC support for the ANC; 
as various groups within the BMC seek the governing party to improve its 
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performance on transformation of the economy. Thus, despite its cognitive 
assessments of the ANC’s poor performance, they continue to support it. 
At the same time and on the other side, higher professionals working within the state 
see the ANC practices of deployment as an attack on occupations, which are central to 
class mobility, middle class location and belonging. The perceived attack of 
occupational and professional spaces is, as this research has shown, significant 
enough to disrupt and fracture BMC support for the ANC.  
Secondly, members of the upper and middle BMC fragment their support of the ANC, 
they are more likely to either withdraw from the electoral system or vote for an 
alternative Black party. The UDM and EFF, particularly the former is gaining 
credence with the upper and middle segments of the BMC located within the state or 
corporate sectors as professionals. The DA is not an option based on their perception 
and experiences of economic exclusion and the invisible colour bar. While still 
seeking to maintain the governing party’s dominance, voting for alternative Black 
party is used as a disciplining measure of the perceived complacency, corruption and 
poor programmatic and policy performance of the ANC. In particular, it is the ANC’s 
inability to address and sanction corruption within the party and state that fragments 
BMC support. Secondly, voting for an alternative Black party is a strategic measure 
aimed at maintaining a transformative agenda. That is, by voting for an alternative 
Black party, the BMC does not risk its class ascension and consolidation mechanisms 
of EE and BEE. Therefore, voting for an alternative Black party is a mechanism of 
putting in place checks and balances to tame the ANC’s dominance and push it for 
better performance.  
The higher professionals as a segment of the upper middle class prizes freedom of 
expression above participation in party political structures. It perceives the ANC as 
highly structured and unwilling to entertain dissent and discussion within the party. 
Thus they take to social media to critics the party. There is the retrospective support 
for the ANC because of the EE and BEE policies, but importantly, there is also the 
future mobility or consolidation that sustains the BMC’s support for the ANC. 
However, sustained political support for the ANC does not solely derive from the 
ANC’s redistributive policies. Instead, sustained BMC support for the ANC is 
reinforced by the socio-economic conditions that the BMC exists within. Thus, as 
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discussed in Chapter 4, Black tax and high levels of consumerism - including debt 
consumption firstly created high levels of precarity in middle class position and 
secondly increased the need to consolidate middle class position. Aspirationally, the 
BMC’s high valuation of education represents its work towards entrenching middle 
class position across generations. It is fair to say that class scholarship has been 
unable to capture the real socio-political capacity of this social group; which I think is 
an indictment on the South African sociological thought. This thesis has argued that 
decreasing BMC support for the ANC, which the ruling party has typically taken for 
granted, signals a far more fundamental socio-political development reflecting a 
repositioning of both the class and the party. First, it indicates that the BMC is 
becoming increasingly confident in its class position, a development allowing it to 
begin critically assessing the wider political landscape; second, it indicates a deeper 
commitment to the developmental needs of the class itself alongside those of the 
country as a whole. 
The popular understanding that Black middle class mobility is attributable to the 
ANC's redistributive policies and thus beholden and dependent on the ANC limits the 
discussion on the BMC’s role and deliverance of social and economic benefits. It 
bears the hallmarks of the historical debates wherein the material inclusion and class 
mobility of Africans under apartheid affected political attitudes towards apartheid. It 
is limited as it was then. 
This suggests that the socio-political character of the upper and middle class is 
maturing, much more complicated and consolidating democracy in particular ways to 
the South African political economy. It follows the Rueschmereyian analysis of 
political character of the BMC.  
6.3 Possible relationship between professional, class and political attitudes 
The social and political significance of the professional Black middle class is diluted 
and hindered by the actions of a parasitic bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and in fact signals 
increasing levels of internal conflict between different elements/segments of the 
BMC. Black middle class has not fully realized that they are carrying the costs of 
poor service delivery from the ANC government, because of its greater concern for 
the deracialisation of the economy and workspaces. An implication of this is the 
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possibility that, as the BMC increases in number, its political significance may be 
precipitated or erupted and be realised through two sets of conflict – first conflict with 
the ANC for better performance, and second greater conflict with white capital – 
foreign and national. This is already being seen through social media feuds, where 
large corporates are increasingly required to respond to issues of poor service, or 
racialised creation of consumption.  
6.4 Commercialisation of the BMC 
Apart from academic attempts to quantify and establish the social and political role of 
the new Black middle class, other studies and news articles have focused on the 
commercial and consumption patterns and power of the growing Black middle class. 
The discourse emerging out of these studies and articles has been one of a fascination 
with the commercial power of the Black middle class, and ultimately resulting in the 
reduction of the importance of this social group to purchasing power and commercial 
citizenship, thus reducing its importance to commercial citizenship. The commercial 
and advertising sector bombards this class with what they can consume, the money 
thereof is financed via debt through an equally parasitic banking system. Exacerbating 
this, is the lag in the development outcomes of the ANC led government, that result in 
the Black middle class fulfilling that role, for instance by having to pay for previously 
white school because of the stillborn failure of the transformed Black schools. 
It is possible that poorer people may aspire to education and skills for themselves and 
their children, in order to ascend to the middle class stratum. If it is perceived that 
class ascendancy results from corruption, this may also have the effect of aspiration 
towards that. But it may also be that more Black people will aspire to being 
professionals as this is a means of class ascendancy as Nzimande (1990) suggested 
when he was analysing the Black middle class of the 1980s. Thirdly, the framing of 
the Black middle class as consumer citizens, may create another understanding of the 
poorer classes in South Africa, which would be those that are under constant 
development, gaining state ‘hand-outs,’ like free water and electricity, housing and 
education and income in the form of grants. Thus if we have two economies – the first 
and the second, it would mean that we have two citizens, the consumer citizens 
belonging in the first economy and the welfare citizens belonging in the second 
economy, their commonality being consumption. An interesting question to follow up 
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would be: what then are the relationships that would be forged between consumer and 
welfare citizens, or the new Black middle class and the poor, unemployed and 
working classes? More importantly, would be what are the class relationships 
between different segments of the Black middle class? 
It is important to understand, as illustrated through this research, that the combination 
of aspiration, Black tax, commercialization and the politicization of this particular 
group of society works in complex ways to sustain, rather than fracture the support for 
the ANC. This trend is particularly acute where BMC individuals image or perceive 
the lack of a political party that is aligned to its class aspiration.   
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Appendix 1 - Focus group schedule  
Questions/Issues for Focus Groups  
1. What do you understand by the term ‘middle class’? Where does the middle 
class begin and where does it stop? 
2. Do you identify yourself as ‘middle class’? If so, why? Is your identity based 
on income, occupation, education, family background, wider social status or 
what? 
3. What was the single most important factor in determining your middle class-
ness? 
4. What implications does ‘middle class-ness’ have for your relations with your 
parents and wider family, relatives and home community? 
5. What does ‘race’, your being Black, have to do with it? How does being Black 
relate to your being middle class? How does being Black and Middle Class 
determine or affect your behaviour in society? 
6. What are the implications in the workplace of your being Black and middle 
class? Are your treated more or less favourably?  
7. Are there better opportunities for Black Middle Class people in the public 
sector or private sector? What are the advantages and disadvantages of 
working in either? 
8. How has being Black and middle class affected where you live? Why did you 
choose to live where you do? 
9. Do you feel secure in your middle class status? If you lost your job and 
income, would you still feel ‘middle class’? 
10. How do you react to the following: 
 ‘I didn’t struggle to be poor’ (Smuts Ngonyama) 
 ‘There is nothing wrong with being ‘filthy rich’’ (Naledi Pandor) 
 Consumer survey depictions of Black Middle Class people as ‘Black 
Diamonds’ 
 Media depictions of the Black middle class as being hopelessly 
indebted? And often corrupt? 
 Does the media give the Black middle class an unnecessarily unfair 
rap? 
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11. How does being Black and Middle Class affect your political leanings and 
attitudes? Does it make your more or less politically independent? 
12. Is the growth of the Black Middle Class ‘a good thing?’ Is it good for South 
Africa and Democracy? 
Appendix 2 - Interview schedule: Black professionals 
1. What do you understand “middle class” to mean? 
2. Based on your understanding, do you consider yourself a middle class person? 
Why/ why not? 
3. What do you think your role is as a Black middle class? 
4. What motivated your educational choices? (For yourself and children?) 
5. What motivated your career and professional choices?  
6. What is your current role in your organisation? What are the key functions 
embedded in this role? 
What does being a professional mean to you? What type of behaviours, 
opinions, and activities does it encapsulate? 
7. What are the understandings of professionalism in your organisation? 
8. How does this idea of professionalism contribute to your organisation’s 
execution of its programmes?  
9. How does your organisation locate itself within the political sphere? 
a. How would you describe the political identity of the place where you 
work? 
b. What are the political philosophies/ideologies/ideas of the 
organisation?  
c. How do people exercise/voice political ideas at work?  
d. How do people organize themselves political at work?  
10. What assessment would you make of the current politics in South Africa? 
(New political parties, tenders, etc.) 
11. Can you describe and define your political identity and how that came about?  
a. How would you describe yourself politically speaking? 
b. What political activities do you get involved in? 
12. How does your political position/ideas interact with your role in the 
workplace? 
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13. Have your political ideas changed or shifted? (Factors? Probe: education, 
skills, work experience)  
14. Do you think professionalization decreases or increases a person’s political 
identity/activity? 
15. For you to succeed in your professional sphere, what kind of political ideas 
and activities do you, or must you, navigate and respond to? 
16. What is the relationship between being a middle class professional and a 
political engaged person? 
 
 
 
